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COPYRIGHT LAW AS AN ENGINE OF PUBLIC
INTEREST PROTECTION
Haochen Sun*
ABSTRACT—Courts around the world have been confronted with
bewilderingly complex challenges in protecting the public interest through
copyright law. This article proposes a public interest principle that would
guide courts to settle fair use cases with better-informed decisions. I argue
that the proposed principle would legally upgrade fair use from serving as an
engine of free expression to serving as an engine of public interest protection.
Based on comparative study of the conflicting rulings handed down by
the U.S. and Chinese courts on Google Library, the article first considers the
necessity of adopting the public interest principle in guiding the judicial
settlement of fair use cases substantively and procedurally. The article then
canvasses the two substantive legal standards to be embodied in the public
interest principle. First, the principle would create a public interest use
standard for courts to utilize in weighing the first fair use factor without
applying the dichotomy of transformative and non-transformative use. At the
same time, it would also require courts to employ the significant market harm
standard when considering the fourth fair use factor. Second, the public
interest principle would also modify the procedural rules concerning the
assignment of burden of proof in fair use cases. It would place only the
burden of proving a public interest use under the first factor on the user of a
work who is the defendant in the judicial proceedings at hand.
*
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Moreover, the article also demonstrates how the public interest
principle could be used to develop a meaningful alternative that bridges the
gaps between the fair use and fair dealing doctrines. By largely preserving
the existing attributes of both, the principle would serve as a commonly
shared principle for adjudicating cases and developing further legislative
reforms in both fair use and fair dealing jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION
Fair use is an awkward creature. It has been hailed as a legal invention
that is essential for human and societal development.1 At the same time, fair
1 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (“From the infancy of
copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary
to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. . . .’” (alteration
in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)); Barton Beebe, Does Judicial Ideology Affect
Copyright Fair Use Outcomes?: Evidence From the Fair Use Case Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 517,
522 (2008) (pointing out that the fair use doctrine defines “the contours of the private and public domains
of human expression and, in doing so, directly impact[s] our capability for human flourishing”); William
W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1661 (1988) (contending
that the fair use doctrine “would contribute to the realization of a more just social order”); Ruth L. Okediji,
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use has become something of a legal monster, causing no end of troubles
owing to its vague and shifting contours. Hence, lamentations that fair use is
the most troublesome2 yet least determinate3 doctrine in copyright law are
hardly surprising.
Accordingly, fair use is fraught with legal dilemmas. Although high
hopes are attached to its potential to protect the public interest, fair use has
suffered a number of setbacks worldwide. Domestic laws governing fair use
are variegated, and, worse still, individual judges may interpret and apply
those laws differently.4 The confluence of these various problems is posing
increasingly grave threats to both copyright holders and users of their works
domestically and globally, given that the protection and exploitation of
copyrighted works now transcends national boundaries more than ever
thanks to the liberalization of international trade and development of digital
technology.
The legal dilemmas that have beset the Google Books Library Project
(Google Library) globally since its inception reflect some of the deep-seated
problems with fair use. Although Google Library is structured using the same
operational standards worldwide, the judicial fair use rulings on the Library’s
fate in different countries are diametrically opposed. On the basis of public

Reframing International Copyright Limitations and Exceptions as Development Policy, in COPYRIGHT
LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 445 (Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2017) (arguing that the fair
use doctrine protects the public interest through “address[ing] a wide range of conduct enabled by new
technologies”); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2540 (2009)
(arguing that the fair use doctrine protects “the interests of subsequent authors in drawing from earlier
works when expressing themselves, as well as the interests of the public in having access to new works
and making reasonable uses of them”); Haochen Sun, Fair Use as a Collective User Right, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 125, 201 (2011) (“Fair use is one of the greatest mechanisms for enriching human society. It sustains
and enhances both cultural dynamics and political democracy in a free and just society.”); Rebecca
Tushnet, Intellectual Property as a Public Interest Mechanism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 95, 99 (Rochelle Dreyfuss & Justine Pila eds., 2018) (pointing out that
fair use “serve[s] public functions” and “the goal of promoting progress”).
2 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (stating that “the issue of fair
use . . . is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright”); see also Monge v. Maya Magazines,
Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Dellar, 104 F.2d at 662).
3 Paul Goldstein, Goldstein On Copyright § 12:3 (3d ed. Supp. 2019) (arguing that “[n]o copyright
doctrine is less determinate than fair use”); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d
1381, 1392 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y.
1968)) (“Fair use is one of the most unsettled areas of the law. The doctrine has been said to be ‘so flexible
as virtually to defy definition.’”); Haochen Sun, Overcoming the Achilles Heel of Copyright Law, 5 NW.
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 265, 283–91 (2007) (discussing how and why the U.S. fair use doctrine is
indeterminate).
4 RUTH L. OKEDIJI, THE INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM: LIMITATIONS, EXCEPTIONS AND
PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 20 (2006), available at
https://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteipc200610_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F9N-T8AQ] (noting that “the actual
substance and scope of [fair use as a copyright limitation] are determined by courts in the course of
adjudication”).
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interest considerations, for example, the U.S. courts have ruled that
Google Library constitutes fair use.5 By contrast, the Chinese courts have
ruled against Google, holding that Google Library does not constitute fair
use, with scant regard paid to the issue of public interest protection.6
Based on comparative study of the Google Library decisions in the U.S.
and China, I put forward in this article a public interest principle that I believe
would guide courts toward better-informed decisions in fair use cases. I
argue that the principle would legally upgrade fair use from serving as an
“engine of free expression”7 to serving as an engine of public interest
protection. As I will demonstrate, adoption of the principle would modify
the judicial application of the fair use doctrine in two major ways.
First, the public interest principle would offer two substantive legal
standards. It would create a public interest use standard for courts to utilize
in weighing the first fair use factor without applying the dichotomy of
transformative and non-transformative use. Meanwhile, it would also require
courts to employ the significant market harm standard when considering the
fourth fair use factor.
Second, the public interest principle would also modify the procedural
rules concerning the assignment of the burden of proof in fair use cases. It
would place only the burden of proving a public interest use under the first
factor on the user who is the defendant in judicial proceedings. At the same
time, it would shift the burden of proving market harm and the other fair use
factors to the copyright holder, the plaintiff who has demonstrated prima
facie copyright infringement in judicial proceedings.
Moreover, I also examine the implications of the public interest
principle for dealing with the differences between the fair use and fair
dealing doctrines. Commentators and policymakers alike have explored
ways of reforming fair dealing by taking advantage of the open-ended,
flexible qualities of fair use8 and of reforming fair use by injecting the
certainties that fair dealing affords.9 In this article, I argue that the public
5

See infra Section I.B.
See infra Section II.C.
7 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); see also Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as a “free speech safeguard[]” and a “First
Amendment accommodation[]”).
8
See, e.g., Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 677 (2014)
(arguing that the fair dealing regimes in the European Union “proved less flexible in responding to
technological developments than American fair use”); ROBERT BURRELL & ALLISON COLEMAN,
COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: THE DIGITAL IMPACT 249–75 (2005).
9 See, e.g., Barton Beebe, Fair Use and Legal Futurism, 25 LAW & LITERATURE 10, 15 (2013)
(pointing out that “[t]he very malleability that was once a virtue of fair use doctrine now leaves it exposed
to powerful efforts to constrict its scope”); Justin Hughes, Fair Use and Its Politics – at Home and
Abroad, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 234, 235 (Ruth L. Okediji ed.,
6
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interest principle can be used to develop a meaningful alternative that bridges
the gaps between the two doctrines. By largely preserving the existing
attributes of both, the principle would serve as a commonly shared principle
for adjudicating cases and developing further legislative reforms in both fair
use and fair dealing jurisdictions.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Part I introduces
the Google Library litigation in the U.S. and China and discusses how the
U.S. and Chinese courts have reached different conclusions on the basis of
the fair use doctrine. Part II compares the differences in that doctrine under
U.S. and Chinese law, and then offers a preliminary consideration of how
those differences led to the differing outcomes of the Google Library
litigation in the two countries. Based on this comparative study, I argue that
a public interest principle ought to be adopted for the judicial application of
the fair use doctrine. Parts III and IV move on to discuss the ways in which
the proposed public interest principle will develop new substantive and
procedural standards for adjudicating fair use cases. Part V concludes by
responding to concerns about the public interest principle and discussing
how it offers an alternative approach to bridging the gaps between the fair
use and fair dealing doctrines.
I.

LITIGATION OVER THE GOOGLE LIBRARY PROJECT IN THE U.S. AND
CHINA
A. Litigation in the U.S.

Google launched the Library Project in December 2004, announcing
that it would utilize then newly developed scanning technology to digitize
the collections of the world’s major research libraries.10 After delivering
2017) (“Fair use as a battleground for the open-ended negation of copyright leads naturally to the ‘threestep test’ of the Berne Convention. . . .”); Sun, supra note 3, at 283 (“The condition that requires copyright
limitations [to] be ‘clearly defined’ and ‘narrow in scope and reach’ calls into question whether the first
prong of the three-step test [as required by Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement] will strike down [fair use
doctrine that is] by nature flexible and open-ended.”); P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Martin Senftleben, Fair
Use in Europe: In Search of Flexibilities 9 (Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2012-39;
Institute for Information Law Research Paper No. 2012-33, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2013239 [https://perma.cc/N9YM-7AWM ] (contending that “the rule of fair use
as it presently exists and is applied in the United States has always attracted criticism, particularly for its
presumed lack of predictability”).
10 See Google Books History, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/googlebooks/about/history.html
[https://perma.cc/Q75P-MULQ]. These libraries included the New York Public Library, Library of
Congress, Harvard Library, and over forty libraries around the world. Id. The project involves scanning
books and displaying bibliographic information along with snippets of the scanned books in the form of
a card catalog on the Google Books website. Id. To facilitate access to global users, Google analyzes each
book scan and creates an overall index of all scanned books. By using the index, users can input a
particular word or phrase to retrieve the most relevant books containing the search term. Id. Online
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digital copies to partner libraries, Google created an electronic database of
books, enabling readers to view snippets of copyrighted books and the entire
texts of public domain books. It also made book texts available for online
searching.11 In the fall of 2005, the Authors Guild, along with several authors,
filed a class action lawsuit against Google in the Southern District Court of
New York, alleging that Google had committed copyright infringement by
scanning copyrighted books and including them in its library without the
permission of the copyright owners.12 The opposing parties attempted to
settle the dispute13 and, after lengthy negotiations, proposed an Amended
Settlement Agreement in 2011.14 However, the district court rejected the
Agreement on the grounds that it was not fair, adequate, or reasonable to
many other copyright owners.15 The parties then engaged in further
negotiations but were unable to reach a settlement.16
In 2013, the district court ruled in Google’s favor on the grounds of fair
use under Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act.17 The Court evaluated each
of the four fair use factors as follows:
(1) the purpose and character of the use: Google’s use of the copyrighted
works was transformative in nature and was for nonprofit, educational
purposes;18
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work: the copyrighted works in
question were mostly published, nonfiction works;19

booksellers can and do avail the opportunity to direct readers to their website from the relevant Google
Books webpage. Id.
11 See
About
Google
Books,
GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/googlebooks/about
[https://perma.cc/E4R5-2UYG] (explaining the searching capacity of the Google Books search feature
and the methods by which users may navigate this search tool).
12 Paul Aiken, Authors Guild Sues Google, Citing “Massive Copyright Infringement”, AUTHORS
GUILD (Sept. 20, 2005), https://www.authorsguild.org/industry-advocacy/authors-guild-sues-googleciting-massive-copyright-infringement [https://perma.cc/X4JG-6HFA] (asserting that Google’s
“unauthorized scanning and copying of books through its Google Library program is a ‘plain and brazen
violation of copyright law’” because “[i]t’s not up to Google or anyone other than the authors, the rightful
owners of these copyrights, to decide whether and how their works will be copied”).
13 Jacob Smilovitz, Google Reaches $125 Million Settlement with Publishers in Google Book Project
Lawsuit, MICH. DAILY (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.michigandaily.com/content/2008-10-29/googlereaches-settlement-university-scanning-continue [https://perma.cc/Q8ZK-K5R3]. In October 2008, the
parties entered into a settlement agreement, in which Google agreed to pay a total of $125 million to
copyright holders whose books had already been scanned without their approval, to compensate the
plaintiffs’ court costs, and to create a Book Rights Registry. Id.
14 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
15 Id. at 686.
16 Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
17 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
18 Authors Guild, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 291–92.
19 Id. at 292.
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(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole: while Google reproduced books in their
entirety, only a limited amount of text was made visible to users, and
users were not provided with full-text copies of the copyrighted books;20
and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work: Google did not sell its digital reproductions of the
copyrighted works, and the reproductions would not substitute for the
works in the marketplace. On the contrary, Google produced market
benefits for the copyright holders because it made the copyrighted works
easier to find and thereby potentially increased their visibility and sale.21
The district court further weighed the four factors holistically in light
of the purpose of the Copyright Act, holding that its fair use ruling was
buttressed by public interest considerations.22
In 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the fair use
ruling made by the district court.23 Moreover, the Second Circuit also
provided more detailed analysis of how the four fair use factors should be
applied, in particular the first factor concerning transformative use and fourth
factor concerning market impact. The Second Circuit took pains to explain
what constitutes transformative use. It first considered whether Google’s
provision of the search and snippet view functions superseded the objects of
creation of the original copyrighted works or added something to those
works with a further purpose24 before opining that those functions did indeed
add to the original works, facilitating their use in new ways. 25 The Second
Circuit further held that “transformative uses tend to favor [a] fair use finding
because a transformative use is one that communicates something new and
different from the original and expands its utility, thus serving copyright’s
overall objective of contributing to public knowledge.”26
The Second Circuit went on to acknowledge that in evaluating fair use,
the first factor, i.e., the purpose and character of use, is closely linked with
the fourth factor concerning market harm. In elaborating further on the fourth
factor, it opined that that factor focuses on whether a copy brings to the
marketplace a competing substitute for the original, or its derivative, so as to
deprive the copyright holder of significant revenue owing to the likelihood

20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id.
Id. at 292–93.
Id. at 293–94.
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2015).
Id. at 214–18.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 214.
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of potential purchasers opting to purchase the copy in preference to the
original. In support of Google, and relying on Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., the Second Circuit stated that “the more the copying is done to achieve
a purpose that differs from the purpose of the original, the less likely it is that
the copy will serve as a satisfactory substitute for the original.”27
In considering the plaintiffs’ arguments, the Second Circuit recognized
that the snippet function “can cause some loss of sales,” or a reduction in
library demand, in situations in which the searcher’s need for access to a text
is satisfied by the snippet view.28 However, it concluded that, despite the
possibility—or even the probability or certainty—of some loss of sales, the
snippet view does not create (and cannot amount to the creation of) an
effectively competing substitute that would tilt the fourth factor in favor of
the Authors Guild.29
B. Litigation in China
Given the enormous potential of the digital library market in China,
Google introduced its Library Project in China in 2007.30 However, it was
immediately confronted with fierce opposition from Chinese copyright
owners. For instance, the China Written Works Copyright Society
(CWWCS) objected that Google was—without authorization—making
available online nearly 18,000 books authored by over 570 Chinese writers.31
In October 2009, the Chinese writer Wang Shen lodged a complaint with the
Beijing First Intermediate Court, contending that Google had infringed her
copyright on her novel Acid Lover by scanning and uploading it to Google
Library without her permission.32
27

Id. at 223.
Id. at 224.
29 Id.
30 See GUAN H. TANG, COPYRIGHT AND THE P UBLIC INTEREST IN CHINA 189 (2011).
31 Vivian Wai-yin Kwok, A Copyright Complaint From China, FORBES (Oct. 21, 2009),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/21/chinese-writer-google-markets-copyrights.html [https://perma.cc/
2359-4DLA]. With regard to compensation, it is noteworthy that under a tentative settlement proposed
by Google (to the Authors Guild in the United States), Google offered to pay a sum of $60 per digitized
book as compensation and also agreed to share 63% of its income derived from readers who would pay
for online reading. Id. However, the parties did not ultimately reach an agreement. Authors Guild v.
Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Pursuant to copyright infringement allegations
by the CWWCS, Google agreed to provide a list of Chinese books scanned for the collection of its Digital
Library, but refused to admit copyright infringement. Chen Jia & Xie Yu, Writer Sues Google for
Copyright Infringement, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/200912/16/content_9184029.htm [https://perma.cc/6SJ5-DS5Y].
32 Wang Xin v. Google, Inc., Beijing Gu Xiang Information Technology Co., Ltd., Beijing No. 1
Intermediate People’s Court, (2011) Yi Zhong Min Chu Zi No. 1321. Although Google removed the
copyrighted work from its digital library soon after the plaintiff filed the lawsuit, she was still concerned
about Google’s attitude toward copyrights and its disrespect for authors. She therefore demanded a public
28
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The intermediate court handed down a lengthy decision.33 At the outset,
the court adopted the approach of conceptually separating Google’s
allegedly infringing acts, namely, its (1) provision of snippet views and (2)
scanning and creation of digital copies. It then considered whether those acts
infringed copyright or could be exempted from infringement liability as fair
use under the Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (Chinese
Copyright Law).34 In evaluating the act of providing snippet views, the
intermediate court held that a novel is a literary work that delivers the
thoughts and feelings of its author, whereas a snippet view exposes no more
than fragmented and incomplete sentences and is thus incapable of achieving
the very purpose of a novel.35 It further reasoned that an interested user would
still likely buy a copy of the novel after seeing, for example, a novel’s title
and the author’s name.36 Following Article 21 of the Regulation on the
Implementation of the Chinese Copyright Law (Copyright Implementation
Regulation),37 the intermediate court then concluded that in this particular
case the snippet views of the plaintiff’s novel would not adversely affect the
market for her novel’s sale. It therefore ruled that snippet views did not
conflict with the normal exploitation of a novel in the marketplace, nor did
they unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of its author. 38
Although the intermediate court deemed the provision of snippets of
Wang’s novel to constitute fair use, it ruled that Google’s digital
apology and damages from Google. See Google Is Sued By Chinese Author Mian Mian, BBC NEWS (Dec.
29, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8433345.stm [https://perma.cc/TC3C-Y3WM]. Google’s
plans created resentment within the community of Chinese writers. Writers including Chen Cun, Wang
Xiaofeng, and You Yunting expressed their anger towards the unauthorized digitalization and the
settlement agreement via Chinese media. There were also voices supporting copyright owners to lodge
complaints against Google in Chinese courts. See Juliet Ye, Google Books Settlement: The Chinese
Chapter, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2009), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/10/20/google-bookssettlement-the-chinese-chapter/ [https://perma.cc/CB5V-XYA2].
33 For a discussion about this ruling, see generally Yong Wan, Similar Facts, Different Outcomes: A
Comparative Study of the Google Books Project Case in China and the United States, 63 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 573 (2016); Sampsung Xiaoxiang Shi & Qian Wang, China’s Fair Use Doctrine After the
Google Books Search Project, in ANNOTATED LEADING COPYRIGHT CASES IN MAJOR ASIAN
JURISDICTIONS (Kung-Chung Liu ed.) (forthcoming 2019).
34 See Wan, supra note 33, at 582; see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa (中华人民共
和国著作权法) [Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l Peoples Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amendment promulgated Feb. 26, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010), art.
22 [hereinafter Chinese Copyright Law].
35 See Shi & Wang, supra note 33, at 4.
36 See id.
37 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa Shishi Tiaoli (中华人民共和国著作权法实施条
例) [Regulations for the Implementation of the Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 2, 2002, amendment promulgated Jan.
30, 2013, effective Mar. 1, 2013), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=13428
[https://perma.cc/VFP4-GAX2].
38 See Shi & Wang, supra note 33.
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reproduction of the novel infringed the author’s copyright. It reasoned that
the normal exploitation of a work warranted that the right to authorize others
to reproduce that work should remain in the full control of the copyright
holder. If a work is reproduced without the copyright holder’s permission,
such reproduction unduly interferes with the normal exploitation of the work
because unauthorized reproduction is likely to negatively affect the
copyright holder’s arrangements to receive royalties from licensing the
work.39 Moreover, the intermediate court held that Google’s reproduction of
the novel had unreasonably prejudiced the plaintiff’s legitimate interests
because it had jeopardized the market value of her novel. 40 It further noted
that Google’s reproduction of the novel might lead to subsequent
unauthorized uses. For example, other parties might retrieve copies of the
novel from Google’s server with the aid of advanced technology.41
Dissatisfied with the intermediate court’s decision, Google appealed to
the Beijing People’s High Court.42 In considering whether Google’s digital
reproduction of the novel could be legally permitted as fair use, the high
court clarified that the conceptual separation of the alleged infringing acts by
the intermediate court had been less than ideal,43 pointing out that
reproduction is in many situations a prerequisite for statutory types of fair
use to occur. In such situations, the act of copying and subsequent actions
related to the use of the copies should not be assessed separately. Rather, in
a given case, the actions taken in pursuit of the permitted uses should be
treated as a whole.44 Therefore, if the act of providing a snippet view is
considered fair use, then the prior act of full-text reproduction might also
constitute fair use.45 Given that Google’s acts did not fall under any
exceptions and limitations laid out under Article 22 of the Chinese Copyright
Law, the High Court considered whether Google’s use of the copyrighted
work fell under the broader principles of fair use.46 It acknowledged that
certain situations falling outside the ambit of Article 22 could still be
considered fair use.47

39

Id. at 5.
Id.
41 See Wan, supra note 33, at 582.
42 Google, Inc. (Appellant) v. Wang Xin (Appellee), Beijing High People’s Court, (2013) Gao Min
Zhong Zi No. 1211. For a partial translation of this decision, see ROBERT P. MERGES & SEAGULL HAIYAN
SONG, TRANSNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: TEXT AND CASES 452–56 (2018).
43 See MERGES & SONG, supra note 42, at 455.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 454.
47 Id.
40
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In this regard, the High Court noted that in determining whether
Google’s act of full reproduction amounted to fair use, the following factors
must be considered: (1) the purpose and character of the use by Google; (2)
the nature of and amount used in relation to the length of the novel; (3) the
effect of Google’s use of the novel upon the normal exploitation of the
copyrighted work by the copyright owner (the plaintiff in the original suit);
and (4) whether Google’s use would unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the copyright owner.48 Although Google alleged that its acts
constituted fair use, it did not provide any factual evidence in relation to the
aforesaid factors. As a result, the High Court rejected Google’s fair use
defense on the grounds of its failure to fulfill its burden to prove fair use.49
II. LOCATING THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN FAIR USE CASES
I now move on to consider why the Chinese and U.S. courts handed
down conflicting rulings on the Google Library cases. I contend that a central
reason for the conflicting rulings lies in how the two countries’ courts treated
the public interest in their fair use analyses. In deciding the Google Library
cases, the U.S. courts regarded the public interest as the principal
consideration in their decision-making process. The Chinese courts, by
contrast, placed little weight on the public interest in that process. I further
suggest that this comparative study actually demonstrates the necessity of
creating a public interest principle to guide judicial rulings on fair use cases.
A. Fair Use Versus Fair Dealing?
There is a major discrepancy in copyright limitations under Chinese and
U.S. copyright law. While the U.S. has adopted a flexible fair use regime,
China follows the comparatively rigid regime of fair dealing. It could be
argued that it is this discrepancy that resulted in the conflicting judicial
rulings on the Google Library cases in the two jurisdictions.
Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act contains a non-exhaustive list of
fair use exemptions,50 which empowers judges to make judicial decisions
based on the four fair use factors51 and any other relevant factor as well.52
The legislative history of Section 107 shows that the fair use regime that it

48

Id. at 455.
Id.
50 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2010).
51 See, e.g., Benjamin Ely Marks, Copyright Protection, Privacy Rights, and the Fair Use Doctrine:
The Post-Salinger Decade Reconsidered, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1376, 1377–78 (1997).
52 Id. at 1378.
49
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undergirds is intended to be broad and flexible.53 For instance, the relevant
Senate and House Committee Report states:
[S]ince the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable
definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its
own facts. . . . The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial
doctrine of fair use . . . but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the
statute. . . . Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and
some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine
to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.54

This statement demonstrates that the codification of the fair use doctrine
still affords judges ample room for making sensible judicial decisions on
what constitutes a fair use.55 As part of judge-made law, the judicial adoption
of transformative use exemplifies the broad and flexible nature of the U.S.
fair use regime. Section 107 is silent on whether transformative use is legal
or not thereunder. It was the U.S. Supreme Court that first embraced
transformativeness as an integral part of fair use analysis.56 The Court opined
that “[t]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a
finding of fair use.”57 Since then, the U.S. courts have applied the
transformative use doctrine in numerous copyright cases.58
Chinese copyright law, by contrast, has statutorily adopted a fair
dealing regime known for operating an exhaustive list of specifically defined
exemptions, thereby affording less flexibility for judges to decide cases.

53

Niva Elkin-Koren & Orit Fischman-Afori, Rulifying Fair Use, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 176 (2017).
Senate and House Committee Reports, quoted in L.E. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN
COPYRIGHT: THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS TENSIONS IN THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT 19–20 (1978).
55 While the legislative intent behind codification of the fair use doctrine was to “inject some degree
of certainty and predictability into its application,” the intent was not to shape the fair use doctrine as
bright-line rules. See Sun, supra note 3, at 284. Flexibilities were retained in the wording of Section 107.
The fair use doctrine is seen as “an equitable rule of reason.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679 (stating that fair use factors are nonexclusive because the fair
use doctrine “is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case
raising the question must be decided on its own facts”).
56 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994) (“[T]he fact that even the force of
that tendency will vary with the context is a further reason against elevating commerciality to hard
presumptive significance.”).
57 Id. at 569; see also Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801–02 (9th Cir. 2003);
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1271–74 (11th Cir. 2001).
58 See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 549, 582–621 (2008); Samuelson, supra note 1, at 2548–55 (2009); Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 736–740 (2011).
54
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Article 22 of the Chinese Copyright Law59 constitutes the major legal basis
for China’s fair dealing regime. As noted, it consists of the exhaustive
enumeration of twelve specific fair use exemptions, allowing the use of
copyrighted works for the purposes of: (1) the user’s personal study,
research, and appreciation; (2) introducing or commenting on or explaining
a certain point with appropriate citation; (3) unavoidable inclusion or quoting
in news reporting; (4) publishing or rebroadcasting among media agencies;
(5) publishing or broadcasting of a speech delivered at a public gathering;
(6) reproducing or translating for teaching and research; (7) fulfilling official
duties by state organs; (8) reproducing a work in the collection of a library,
archive, memorial hall, museum, art gallery, or any similar institution for the
display or preservation of the work; (9) performing a published work under
special circumstances; (10) producing, drawing, photographing, or video
recording of a work of art displayed in an outdoor public place; (11)
translating Chinese works from the Han language into the languages of
China’s minority ethnic groups; and (12) transliterating works into braille
for the blind.60 Moreover, the Regulation on the Protection of the Right to
Communicate Works to the Public over Information Networks
(Communication Right Regulation)61 extends the application of certain fair
dealing exemptions enumerated in Article 22.
The application of the fair use exemptions under Article 22 of the
Copyright Law and Article 6 of the Communication Right Regulation are
further governed by the Copyright Implementation Regulation. Article 21 of
the Copyright Implementation Regulation prescribes that “exploitation of a
published work which may be exploited without permission from the

59 Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Zhu Zuo Quan Fa (中华人民共和国著作权法) [Copyright
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept.
7, 1990, amendment promulgated Feb. 26, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010), art. 22.
60 Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 34, art. 22.
61 Xin Xi Wang Luo Chuan Bo Quan Tiao Li (信息网络传播权保护条例) [Regulation on Protection
of the Right to Network Dissemination of Information] (promulgated by the Order No. 468 of the State
Council of the People’s Republic of China on May 18, 2006, as amended by the Decision of the State
Council on Amending the Regulation on Protection of the Right to Network Dissemination of Information
on January 30, 2013), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=13403
[https://perma.cc/UG85-TG3M]. Article 6 of the Communication Right Regulation stipulates eight
permissible uses of copyright works on the Internet, including: (1) appropriate citation for the purpose of
introducing or commenting; (2) news reporting; (3) providing teachers and researchers with a small
quantity of published works for classroom use or research; (4) communicating works to the public by
state organs for the purpose of fulfilling official duties; (5) translation into minority nationality languages
and making available to ethnic minorities; (6) communicating and making published works perceivable
to the print-disabled for non-profit purposes; (7) communicating published articles that are relevant to
current news events; and (8) communicating speeches addressed to the public. Id. art. 6. When courts are
dealing with Internet-related fair use cases, they should directly apply the Communication Right
Regulation.
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copyright owner in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Copyright
Law shall not impair the normal exploitation of the work concerned, nor
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the copyright owner.”62
Ostensibly, reproducing copyrighted works for the purpose of digital
libraries falls outside the ambit of the foregoing Article 22 and Article 6.
None of the fair dealing exemptions thereunder permit this type of
unauthorized reproduction. Therefore, the statutory provisions do lend
strong support to the Chinese courts’ rulings against Google. However, I
disagree with the opinion that the differences between the American fair use
and Chinese fair dealing regimes led to the conflicting judicial decisions on
the Google Library cases.63 Instead, I contend that it is the diametrically
opposed approaches to applying public interest considerations that resulted
in those conflicting opinions. In the two following sections, I analyze the
extent to which the U.S. and Chinese courts applied such considerations.
B. The U.S. Courts: Taking the Public Interest Seriously
In deciding the Google Library cases, both the Southern District Court
of New York and Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit gingerly
considered the extent to which the public interest should be protected in their
overall fair use assessments. At the macro level, they regarded the public
interest as a guiding consideration in conducting the overall fair use analysis.
At the micro level, they took the public interest into account in their specific
analysis of the fair use factors. Citing the Supreme Court’s Campbell ruling,
the district court defined fair use as a legal doctrine that functions “to fulfill
copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.’”64 The Second Circuit provided further analysis on the public interest
by first finding that it is “the public” who should be regarded as “the ultimate,
primary intended beneficiary [of copyright protection].”65 Following a
review of the history of fair use,66 the Second Circuit concluded that it is the
mandate of public interest protection that should guide the judicial
assessment of a fair use case, which normally centers on a four-factor
analysis because a fair use assessment, by nature, requires an effort “to define
the boundary limit of the original author’s exclusive rights in order to best
62

Id. art. 21.
See, e.g., Wan, supra note 33, at 574 (“Why did Google win the case in the United States, but lose
in China? The goals of this article are to show the differences in the copyright exceptions system between
China and the United States, and to highlight how China may learn from the U.S.’s flexible fair use
doctrine.”).
64 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
65 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2015).
66 Id. at 213.
63
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serve the overall objectives of the copyright law to expand public learning
while protecting the incentives of authors to create for the public good.”67
Moving beyond a general discussion of the role of the public interest
principle, both the district court and Second Circuit boldly demonstrated that
it is appropriate for courts to directly apply public interest considerations in
determining the final outcome of their overall fair use assessment. Courts
may further consider the broader public interest on top of their analyses of
the four fair use factors. The district court first delved into the four-factor
fair use analysis, and then applied public interest considerations to decide the
outcome of the case as follows:
Google Books provides significant public benefits. It advances the progress of
the arts and sciences, while maintaining respectful consideration for the rights
of authors and other creative individuals, and without adversely impacting the
rights of copyright holders. It has become an invaluable research tool that
permits students, teachers, librarians, and others to more efficiently identify and
locate books. It has given scholars the ability, for the first time, to conduct fulltext searches of tens of millions of books. It preserves books, in particular outof-print and old books that have been forgotten in the bowels of libraries, and it
gives them new life. It facilitates access to books for print-disabled and remote
or underserved populations. It generates new audiences and creates new sources
of income for authors and publishers. Indeed, all society benefits.68

Similarly, the Second Circuit concluded that the case should first be
decided by careful scrutiny of the four fair use factors and then by the
application of public interest considerations:
[C]onsidering the four fair use factors in light of the goals of copyright, we
conclude that Google’s making of a complete digital copy of Plaintiffs’ works
for the purpose of providing the public with its search and snippet view
functions (at least as snippet view is presently designed) is a fair use and does
not infringe Plaintiffs’ copyrights in their books. 69

Relatedly, in another digital library litigation, Authors Guild v.
HathiTrust,70 the District Court also applied the public interest principle to
supplement its analysis of the four fair use factors as follows:
The enhanced search capabilities that reveal no in-copyright material, the
protection of Defendants’ fragile books, and, perhaps most importantly, the
unprecedented ability of print-disabled individuals to have an equal opportunity
to compete with their sighted peers in the ways imagined by the [Americans

67
68
69
70

Id.
Authors Guild, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 293.
Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 225.
902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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with Disabilities Act] protect the copies made by Defendants as fair use to the
extent that Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of infringement. In
addition to the briefs submitted by the parties, the two memoranda filed by
amici further confirm that the underlying rationale of copyright law is enhanced
by the [HathiTrust Digital Library].71

In these decisions, courts did not rely solely on their application of the
four fair use factors, as other U.S. courts had previously done. Instead, at the
macro level, they asserted that analysis of those factors must be weighed in
light of the public interest principle. In rendering their decisions, they
considered the concrete public benefits of the Google and HathiTrust
libraries. Although they did not explicitly apply the concept of users’ rights
as other courts have done,72 their decisions imply that copyright law should
protect uses of copyrighted materials if said uses carry “substantial spillover
potential associated with dramatically improved public access to millions of
books and the ideas, knowledge, stories, and so on contained in them.”73
At the micro level, the Second Circuit further cast light on how the
public interest principle should be applied in interpreting the first and fourth
fair use factors, which are normally understood as the most important of the
four.74 Since the Supreme Court’s Campbell ruling, transformative use has
presumptively been deemed fair because it “adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character” to the works it copied.75 These
functions of transformative use, according to the Supreme Court, fulfill the
goal of copyright protection as they protect the public interest.76 Building on
the Campbell ruling, the Second Circuit spelled out the importance of
transformative use as follows:
The more the appropriator is using the copied material for new, transformative
purposes, the more it serves copyright’s goal of enriching public knowledge and
the less likely it is that the appropriation will serve as a substitute for the original
or its plausible derivatives, shrinking the protected market opportunities of the
copyrighted work.77

71

Id. at 464.
NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 485 (2d Cir. 2004) (Jacobs, J., concurring); Suntrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001).
73 BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 360
(2012).
74 See Beebe, supra note 58, at 578.
75 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward a
Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)).
76 Id. (“Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the
goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative
works.”) (internal citation omitted).
77 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2015).
72
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With this appreciation of the role of transformative use, the Second
Circuit then explained why it is presumptively deemed to constitute fair use:
[T]ransformative uses tend to favor a fair use finding because a transformative
use is one that communicates something new and different from the original or
expands its utility, thus serving copyright’s overall objective of contributing to
public knowledge.78

In light of such a public interest-oriented understanding of
transformative use, the Second Circuit went on to consider whether the new
use (i.e., provision of the search and snippet view of copyrighted books)
merely superseded the objects of creation of the original copyrighted books
or instead added something new to them with a further purpose. If new
elements were added, then the new use may be considered transformative.
The Second Circuit opined that the search and snippet view functions
facilitated the use of the copyrighted books in new ways, and therefore
constituted transformative uses thereof.79 Another major contribution made
by the Second Circuit was its direct grounding of the fourth factor of the fair
use doctrine in public interest considerations. I discuss this contribution in
further detail in Part III.80
C. The Chinese Courts: Insufficient Consideration of the Public Interest
While the U.S. courts settled the Google Library disputes based on the
public interest, the Chinese courts gave scant consideration to the public
interest in their rulings. At the outset of its first-instance ruling, the Beijing
First Intermediate Court pointed out that the ultimate goal of Chinese
copyright law is to protect the public interest. According to the intermediate
court, the law allows authors to receive financial gains from the copyright
protection of their works. That protection encourages more people to create
original works on the one hand, and promotes the production and
dissemination of those works on the other. From this perspective, the
intermediate court inferred that the protection of authors’ exclusive rights
serves as a means to the end of higher societal interests.81 Fair use, under
Chinese copyright law, is intended to fulfill that goal.82

78

Id.
Id. at 217 (“We cited A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639–40 (4th
Cir.2009), Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir.2007), and Kelly v. Arriba
Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir.2003) as examples of cases in which courts had similarly found
the creation of complete digital copies of copyrighted works to be transformative fair uses when the copies
‘served a different function from the original.’”).
80 See infra text accompanying notes 162–64.
81 See Wan, supra note 33, at 582.
82 See id.
79
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Despite making the foregoing point, however, the intermediate court
did not situate its fair use analysis in achievement of the goal of Chinese
copyright law. Instead, it focused its legal analysis on the extent to which
Google Library negatively affected the economic interests of the copyright
holders concerned. The court first considered whether Google’s full-text
reproduction of the copyrighted books conflicted with the books’ normal
exploitation by the copyright holders.83 It reasoned that the most important
type of normal use of a copyrighted work is its reproduction. If a party seeks
to reproduce a copyrighted work, then that party is bound to compensate the
copyright holder by paying an appropriate licensing fee.84 That fee brings in
revenue for the copyright holder, and therefore licensed use constitutes a
normal use of copyrighted work. Following this line of reasoning, the
intermediate court held that if full-text reproduction were not considered to
be in conflict with normal use, then a copyright holder would be unable to
assert control over his or her right of reproduction.85
Furthermore, the intermediate court considered whether Google’s fulltext reproduction could potentially jeopardize a work’s market value, thereby
unreasonably prejudicing the legitimate right of copyright holders. It pointed
out that the market interest of copyright holders can primarily be harmed in
two ways. First, full-text reproduction opens the door for subsequent uses
without authorization from copyright holders and without the payment of
licensing fees, thereby negatively affecting their commercial interests.
Second, full-text reproduction makes digital versions of books more readily
available online, making it easier for third parties to also reproduce them,
thereby amplifying the risk of further unauthorized exploitation.86
Accordingly, the intermediate court concluded that, given its potentially
negative economic impact on copyright holders, Google’s full-text
reproduction did not constitute fair use.87 Being solely focused on the market
impact factor,88 the intermediate court did not make any inquiry into the
purpose and nature of the use of the copyrighted books or the beneficial
impact on the public.
On appeal, the Beijing High Court agreed with the intermediate court
by also finding that full-text reproduction did not constitute fair use as
stipulated in Article 22 of the Chinese Copyright Law. The High Court
acknowledged the possibility of going beyond the exhaustive list of
83
84
85
86
87
88
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exceptions and limitations under Article 22, as well as the feasibility of
analyzing the case in light of factors akin to the four fair use factors.89 It did
not, however, delve into whether Google Library constituted a new type of
fair use that is permissible under Article 22, nor did it apply the factors it
posited. Instead, it required Google to supply evidence in support of its fair
use defense.90 Failure to satisfy this burden of proof, according to the High
Court, would lead to a rejection of that defense.91 Although Google did not
supply the required evidence, the High Court could have chosen to consider
whether Google’s full-text reproduction constituted transformative use in the
larger interest of the public.
D. The Need to Create a Public Interest Principle
As discussed in the preceding sections, courts in the U.S. and China
took diametrically opposed approaches to determining the outcomes of the
Google Library disputes. The U.S. court rulings evince the role of public
interest considerations in interpreting the substantive legal standards for
settling copyright disputes in general and creating future digital public
libraries in particular. On the contrary, the Chinese court rulings demonstrate
that if courts do not take the public interest seriously, they will fail to make
decisions that are in line with the public interest ethos that copyright law is
intended to serve.
Drawing on this comparative study, I argue in the two following parts
that courts should adopt a public interest principle that functions to guide
judicial consideration of fair use cases both substantively and procedurally.
This principle carries two substantive legal standards. First, it creates a new
“public interest use” standard which requires courts to consider whether a
work was used for the public interest regardless of whether the use is
transformative or not. Second, it employs the “market substitution” standard
to weigh the impact of the use on the economic value of the work. Following
this standard, courts can only rule against any use of a work that significantly
replaces the copyright holder’s work in the marketplace.
Moreover, procedurally, the proposed principle shifts the burden of
proving fair use for the last three factors to copyright holders while keeping
the burden of such proof for the first factor firmly with users. This shift in
the burden of proof derives from the public interest use standard and is also
supported by the redefinition of fair use as a collective user right rather than
an affirmative defense.

89
90
91

See MERGES & SONG, supra note 42, at 455.
Id.
Id.
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At first blush, the public interest principle is grounded in the legitimacy
of copyright law as the long-entrenched guardian of the public interest. The
Statute of Anne, the very first copyright statute, was designed as “An Act for
the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
the Authors or purchasers of such Copies. . . .”92 The Copyright Clause of the
American Constitution grants Congress the power to confer copyright upon
authors for the purpose of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.”93 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “‘Progress of Science’ . . .
refers broadly to ‘the creation and spread of knowledge and learning.’”94
Internationally, copyright treaties have also enshrined the public
interest as a guiding principle, 95 lending strong support to the adoption of the
proposed principle. For instance, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)96 states the public interest
objectives of intellectual property protection.97 Article 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement adopts the public interest principle by stipulating that intellectual
92 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710). Influenced by this legislative tradition, the Canadian Copyright Act, for
instance, is structured as “a balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator. . . .” LTC
HARMS, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CASE BOOK 181 (3d ed. 2012).
93 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
94 Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 324 (2012); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 245 (2002)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing “the basic Clause objective” as “‘promot[ing] the Progress of Science,’
i.e., knowledge and learning”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991)
(holding that “[t]he primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.”)
(citations omitted); Orrin Hatch & Thomas Lee, “To Promote the Progress of Science”: The Copyright
Clause and Congress’s Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2002) (“Everyone
agrees that the notion of ‘science’ in the founding era referred generally to all forms of knowledge and
learning.”).
95 See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, Fair Use, Fair Dealing, Fair Principles: Efforts to Conceptualize
Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 499, 518 (2010) (concluding
that “‘public interest’ . . . has always formed part of international copyright law and policy”); Ruth L.
Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 81–82 (2000)
(finding that “the negotiators and drafters of the [TRIPS] Agreement . . . were primarily concerned
with . . . the public interest principles that serve as a basis for copyright”).
96 Agreement on Trade-Related Agreements of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
97 Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement states the public interest objectives as follows:

The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion
of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social
and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
Id. at art.7; see also Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L.
REV. 979, 1007 (2009) (pointing out that the official view of Article 7 is that it is “intended to strike a
balance that more widely promotes social and economic welfare”).

142

16:123 (2019)

Copyright Law as an Engine of Public Interest Protection

property protection should “promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance to [countries’] socio-economic and technological
development.”98 Moreover, the Preamble of the WIPO Copyright Treaty
emphasizes “the need to maintain a balance between the rights of authors
and the larger public interest, particularly education, research and access to
information. . . .”99
The U.S. Supreme Court has exemplified how to implement protection
of the public interest as the primary goal of copyright law in its fair use
rulings. For example, in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., the Court ruled in favor of using a work for a time-shifting purpose
because it “yields societal benefits” by “expand[ing] public access to freely
broadcast television programs.”100 In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,101
the Court emphasized that the fair use doctrine as a whole furthers the public
interest as the primary objective of copyright law. It found that “[f]rom the
infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted
materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. . . .’”102
Given the venerable goal of upholding the socially beneficial function
of copyright law,103 I further propose that as long as courts apply the public
interest principle in deciding fair use cases, copyright law will serve as an
engine of public interest protection. Accordingly, in Parts III and IV of the

98

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 96, at art. 8.
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997).
100 464 U.S. 417, 454 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion stated that “[t]he fair
use doctrine . . . permits works to be used for ‘socially laudable purposes.’” Id. at 478–79 (quoting
Copyright Office, Briefing Papers on Current Issues, reprinted in 1975 House Hearings 2051, 2055). The
dissenting opinion also pointed out “[t]he fair use doctrine acts as a form of subsidy—albeit at the first
author’s expense—to permit the second author to make limited use of the first author’s work for the public
good.” Id. at 478.
101 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
102 Id. at 575 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). Other U.S. courts have applied public interest
as a major consideration in fair use rulings. See, e.g., Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d
792, 806 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding fair use based partially upon the policy that “the public benefit in
allowing artistic creativity and social criticism to flourish is great”); Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass’n,
745 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (concluding that “it is highly significant to the scope of fair use
that plaintiff accepted public funds to support his artwork. This fact broadens the scope of the fair use
exemption because of the strong public interest, protected by the First Amendment, in free criticism of
the expenditure of federal funds.”).
103 See Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee Weatherall, If We Redesigned Copyright From Scratch, What
Might It Look Like?, in WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT? 7 (Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee
Weatherall eds., 2017) (reviewing “[t]he fundamental societal goals commonly described as constituting
the public interest in copyright”); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1107 (1990) (“The copyright is not an inevitable, divine, or natural right that confers on authors the
absolute ownership of their creations. It is designed rather to stimulate activity and progress in the arts
for the intellectual enrichment of the public.”).
99
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article, I discuss how the public interest principle should be adopted and
applied both substantively and procedurally under the fair use doctrine. I
further consider the principle’s feasibility for guiding the fair dealing
doctrine in Part V.
III. CREATING TWO SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST
PRINCIPLE
In this part of the article, I consider how the public interest principle
can lead to the adoption of the “public interest use” and “significant market
substitution” standards in judicial inquiries into fair use.
A. Public Interest Use
As proposed in Section D of Part II, in applying the first fair use factor,
namely, “the purpose and character of the use,”104 courts should instead
utilize the public interest use standard to examine whether an unauthorized
use of a work primarily benefits the public interest in character. Such
utilization would require courts to dismantle the dichotomy between
transformative and non-transformative uses. The public interest standard not
only treats transformative use as a typical public interest use, but also weighs
non-transformative uses in light of the public interest. If a nontransformative use promotes that interest, then it should be deemed to be in
compliance with the first fair use factor.
1. Transformative Use
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Campbell,105
transformativeness has been the predominant legal standard for weighing the
first fair use factor.106 In Campbell, the Court opined that the “the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other
factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”107
104

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
510 U.S. at 585 (“[T]he fact that even the force of that tendency will vary with the context is a
further reason against elevating commerciality to hard presumptive significance.”).
106 See Beebe, supra note 58, at 606 (pointing out that “a finding of transformativeness may be
dispositive of the outcome of the fair use test”); Netanel, supra note 58, at 768 (“Since 2005, the
transformative use paradigm has come to dominate fair use case law. . . .”); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair
Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 84 (2012) (concluding that “transformative use by the defendant is a robust
predictor of a finding of fair use”); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms
Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 555 (2004) (arguing that “fair use law has
been realigned around transformative use”).
107 510 U.S. at 579; see also Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir.
2003) (“The Supreme Court has recognized that parodic works, like other works that comment and
criticize, are by their nature often sufficiently transformative to fit clearly under the fair use exception.”);
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The more transformative the new work,
the less important the other factors, including commercialism, become.”); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton
105
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Transformative use, by its very nature, protects the public interest. Of
course, the immediate beneficiary is the copier who uses the work for the
transformative purpose concerned. For instance, by making transformative
use of copyrighted books, Google received the immediate benefit of creating
Google Library. However, the ultimate beneficiaries are members of the
public. By adding a “new expression, meaning, or message”108 or function109
to the original work, a transformative use communicates a new work or the
original to the public with benefits that the copyright holder of the original
work did not intend to offer.110 Therefore, it ultimately “enrich[es] public
knowledge.”111
As discussed in Part II, transformative use, as required by the first fair
use factor, is one of the key reasons the U.S. courts ruled in favor of
Google.112 When weighing the search function afforded by Google Library,
the Second Circuit took pains to examine the public benefits that Google’s
transformative use produced:
As with HathiTrust (and iParadigms), the purpose of Google’s copying of the
original copyrighted books is to make available significant information about
those books, permitting a searcher to identify those that contain a word or term
of interest, as well as those that do not include reference to it. In addition,
through the Ngrams tool, Google allows readers to learn the frequency of usage
of selected words in the aggregate corpus of published books in different
historical periods. We have no doubt that the purpose of this copying is the sort
of transformative purpose described in Campbell as strongly favoring
satisfaction of the first factor. 113

The purpose of Google’s reproduction of copyrighted books, according
to the Second Circuit, was to add an information search function to the
books, a function that the copyright holders did not offer. That function
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1271–74 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[C]onsideration of [the transformative nature of
the parody] certainly militates in favor of a finding of fair use, and, informs our analysis of the other
factors.”).
108 510 U.S. at 579.
109 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[M]aking
an exact copy of a work may be transformative so long as the copy serves a different function than the
original work.” (citing Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818–19)). The court found a search engine’s copying of website
images in order to create an Internet search index transformative because the original works “serve[d] an
entertainment, aesthetic, or informative function, [whereas the] search engine transforms the image into
a pointer directing a user to a source of information.” Id.
110 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2015) (concluding that “transformative
uses tend to favor a fair use finding because a transformative use is one that communicates something
new and different from the original or expands its utility, thus serving copyright’s overall objective of
contributing to public knowledge”).
111 Id.
112 See supra text accompanying notes 24–27.
113 Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 217.
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ultimately benefits readers and researchers, who are members of the public,
enabling them to efficiently locate information contained in a book and learn
the frequency of select word usage.
Google Library’s snippet view function was similarly deemed by the
Second Circuit to constitute a transformative use on the same grounds:
Google’s division of the page into tiny snippets is designed to show the searcher
just enough context surrounding the searched term to help her evaluate whether
the book falls within the scope of her interest. . . . Snippet view thus adds
importantly to the highly transformative purpose of identifying books of interest
to the searcher.114

The above passage shows that the ultimate beneficiaries of the snippet
view function are information searchers, who again are members of the
public. As a transformative use, the function serves their interest in
evaluating the content surrounding search words, thereby providing them
with a better understanding of search results extracted from a vast pool of
information.
A series of other fair use rulings lend support to transformative use
being identified as a type of public interest use. Take parodic use cases as an
example.115 In Campbell, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that parody
transforms a work for the purpose of humorous comment or criticism,
thereby “provid[ing] social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and,
in the process, creating a new one.”116 In Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit grounded its ruling on
parodic use in policy considerations, writing that “the public interest is
always served in promoting First Amendment values and in preserving the
public domain from encroachment.”117
2. Non-Transformative Use
The public interest use standard also protects non-transformative uses
of works that promote the public interest. It requires courts to treat
transformative and non-transformative uses equally when they are made in
the public interest. The non-transformative use of a work utilizes “the same
‘overall function’” of the work from which the user copied.118 For instance,
114

Id. at 218.
See David Tan, The Lost Language of the First Amendment in Copyright Fair Use: A Semiotic
Perspective of the “Transformative Use” Doctrine Twenty-Five Years On, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 345 (2016) (pointing out that parody “advanc[es] democratic debate on matters
of public interest through the use of irreverent humor”).
116 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
117 268 F.3d 1257, 1275 (11th Cir. 2001).
118 Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Peter Letterese &
Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1311 (11th Cir. 2008)).
115
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preparing coursepacks by copying textbooks published by others does not
alter the function of the copyrighted materials and therefore constitutes a
non-transformative use.119 Given that such use serves the same purpose or
function as the original work,120 courts have routinely disfavored shielding
it, and therefore have generally treated it as tantamount to an infringing
use.121
Although a non-transformative use can be made for a user’s personal
interest, it can also be made in the public interest, that is, to benefit others.
Commentators have found many instances in which non-transformative use
promotes democratic progress and educational development through the
wider dissemination of information.122 Professor Rebecca Tushnet, for
example, has convincingly demonstrated how various non-transformative
uses not only protect freedom of expression by positively facilitating copiers’
free speech activities,123 but also promote larger social values by affording
audiences access to copiers’ speech.124
Similarly, several landmark copyright cases have demonstrated the
necessity of legalizing non-transformative uses that protect the public
interest. For instance, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust125 epitomizes cases
in which non-transformative use may promote social justice. The Second
Circuit decided that HathiTrust’s reproductions of works to facilitate access
to them by the print disabled constituted a non-transformative use.126
However, it still ruled in favor of HathiTrust under the first fair use factor by
recognizing the public benefits accruing to print-disabled readers from the

119

See id. at 1264 (“In the coursepack cases, . . . the first factor weighed against a finding of fair use
when the nontransformative, educational use in question was performed by a for-profit copyshop, and
was therefore commercial. In a more recent case, a district court refused to allow a commercial copyshop
to sidestep the outcome of the coursepack cases by requiring its student customers to perform the
photocopying themselves (for a fee) when assembling paper coursepacks from master copies held by the
copyshop.”) (citations omitted).
120 See Sun, supra note 1, at 188 (noting that the transformative uses are differentiated from nontransformative uses because the latter “simply copy the original copyrighted works and thereby make no
new contributions to enrich culture”).
121 See, e.g., L.A. Times v. Free Republic, No. CV 98-7840 MMM (AJWx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5669, at *75 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2000) (“Conversely, the amount and substantiality of the copying and
the lack of any significant transformation of the articles weigh heavily in favor of plaintiffs . . . .”).
122 Tushnet, supra note 106, at 566.
123 Id. at 565–66.
124 Id. at 562 (contending that “[pure] copying is of value to audiences who have access through
copying to otherwise unavailable speech. It also enhances copiers’ ability to express themselves; to
persuade others; and to participate in cultural, religious, and political institutions.”).
125 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).
126 Id. at 101–02.
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access afforded them.127 Relying on the legislative history of U.S. law, the
court asserted that providing access to works for the print disabled “assure[s]
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic
self-sufficiency for such individuals.”128
Cambridge University Press v. Patton is another leading case that
marks a watershed in valuing the social function of non-transformative uses
in promoting education. In this case, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Georgia
State University’s operation of an electronic reserve system that allowed its
professors to make digital copies of excerpts of copyrighted books available
to their students did not constitute a transformative use. According to the
ruling, such use did not add new meaning129 or purpose130 to the excerpts
concerned. Rather, it served the same function as the excerpts, that is,
constituting course reading material for university students.131 The Eleventh
Circuit ruled, however, that because the non-transformative use was made
by a university, that is, by a nonprofit educational institution, it deserved
favorable protection under the first fair use factor.132 This opinion followed
the legislative intention of ensuring the proper treatment of educational use
as a paradigmatic example of fair use.133 It also recognized the value of
educational use in fulfilling copyright law’s goal of furthering the public
interest.134

127
Id. at 102 (“We conclude that providing access to the print-disabled is still a valid purpose under
Factor One even though it is not transformative.”).
128 Id. (citing Congress’s statement in the Americans with Disabilities Act).
129 Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Although a professor
may arrange these excerpts into a particular order or combination for use in a college course, this does
not imbue the excerpts themselves with any more than a de minimis amount of new meaning.”).
130 Id. at 1263 (“Nor do Defendants use the excerpts for anything other than the same intrinsic
purpose—or at least one of the purposes—served by Plaintiffs’ works: reading material for students in
university courses.”).
131 Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“Although an
electronic reserve system may facilitate easy access to excerpts of Plaintiffs’ works, it does nothing to
transform those works. . . . Rather, Defendants’ use of excerpts of Plaintiffs’ works ‘supersede[s] the
objects of the original creation.’”).
132 Id. at 1267 (“Furthermore, we find this sufficiently weighty that the first factor favors a finding
of fair use despite the nontransformative nature of the use. . . . [W]e are persuaded that, despite the recent
focus on transformativeness under the first factor, use for teaching purposes by a nonprofit, educational
institution such as Defendants’ favors a finding of fair use under the first factor, despite the
nontransformative nature of the use.”).
133 Id. (“Congress devoted extensive effort to ensure that fair use would allow for educational
copying under the proper circumstances and was sufficiently determined to achieve this goal that it
amended the text of the statute at the eleventh hour in order to expressly state it.”).
134 Id. (“[A]llowing latitude for educational fair use promotes the goals of copyright.”); id. at 1282
(“Nonprofit educational uses are more likely to be fair because they promote the ultimate aims of
copyright—the creation and dissemination of knowledge.”).
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I have demonstrated that the traditional dichotomy between
transformative and non-transformative use serves to undervalue certain
legitimate public interests. Both can promote the public interest, provided
that the ultimate beneficiaries of the use in question are members of the
public. As Justice Blackmun wisely ascertained, there is a “humanitarian
impulse” built in to the first fair use factor because its intent “is to encourage
users to engage in activities the primary benefit of which accrues to
others.”135 Therefore, guided by the public interest principle, courts should
replace the dichotomy between transformative and non-transformative use
with the public interest use standard in the first fair use factor inquiry. At the
same time, given the application of that standard, courts may also consider
removing the commerciality standard from the first factor.136 As
demonstrated earlier in this subsection, cases involving transformative and
non-transformative uses of works for commercial purposes can actually
serve the public interest. Therefore, both commercial and non-commercial
uses can promote the public interest.137 Given that the ultimate goal of the
first factor is to consider the public interest, it is unnecessary for courts to
consider the commerciality standard.
3. Identifying Group-Based and Society-Based Public Interests
How then do courts identify a public interest use under the first fair use
factor? I propose that they can do so by ascertaining whether the use of a
work has produced either group-based or society-based interests.138
Group-based interests can be recognized on the basis of the identities
of the group members who take part in various social and cultural
activities.139 Examples of groups whose activities constitute fair use include
researchers, educators, and journalists. The importance of protecting group-

135 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 496 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
136 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has downgraded the importance of the commerciality standard
for transformative use. In Sony, the Court stated that “every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the
copyright.” 464 U.S. at 451. In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Court further
explicated commercial use, noting that it is a “factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use”
because “the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the
customary price.” 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). However, in Campbell, the Supreme Court refuted its earlier
rulings in Sony and Harper & Row with regard to the commerciality standard, instead ruling that “the
more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism,
that may weigh against a finding of fair use.” 510 U.S. at 579.
137 See, e.g., MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL P ROPERTY AND
GLOBAL JUSTICE 118 (2012) (pointing out that “the history of fair use is replete with commercial uses”).
138 See Sun, supra note 1, at 177 (“Both types of collective rights allow the public to enjoy freedom
in asserting collective interests in utilizing copyrighted works.”).
139 Id. at 178.
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based interests can be inferred from a number of judicial rulings. In Sega
Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. ,140 for example, courts applied the fair use
doctrine to protect the public interest in reverse engineering technology that
allows software engineers as a group of users to achieve the interoperability
of different software programs.141
Courts may first identify either the identity-based group to which the
users of copyrighted works belong or the larger social benefits that may be
generated by the unauthorized use of such works. In doing so, courts would
place themselves in a better position to consider the extent to which the
unauthorized use of copyrighted works affects the protection of group
members’ interests more widely or promotes the creation of social benefits.
For instance, research as a permitted fair use encompasses not only an
individual research activity but also research as “a practice or system,”142
which is a collective activity that many participate in as a group of
researchers.
The society-based interests involved in the use of a work are designed
to ensure that “the public as a whole can live in a free and just society.” 143
These interests are related to the overall economic, political, and cultural
needs of the society to which that public belongs. The emergence of Internetrelated technologies resulted in a host of new copyright disputes. Relying on
the legal concept of transformative use, courts have moved to protect the
public interest in benefiting from progress in such technologies. In Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp.,144 Field v. Google Inc.,145 and their progeny,146 the U.S.
courts ruled that the reproduction in their entirety of numerous photographs
or web pages to create and operate Internet search engines constitutes fair
use. The U.S. courts ascertained that because they were created by search

140

977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1523 (ruling that reverse engineering “has led to an increase in the number of independently
designed video game programs offered for use with the [plaintiff’s] console”); see also Pamela Samuelson
& Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1608–09
(2002) (“From this approximation of source code, reverse engineers can discern or deduce internal design
details of the program, such as information necessary to develop a program that will interoperate with the
decompiled or disassembled program.”).
142 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 399 (Can.), ¶¶ 48, 51, 63
(emphases added), available at http://scc.lexum.org/en/2004/2004scc13 /2004scc13.pdf.
143 Sun, supra note 1, at 180.
144 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
145 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
146 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (ruling that
the display of thumbnail images of the copyrighted photographs constituted fair use).
141
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engines serving as an electronic reference tool, such reproductions benefited
society as a whole by improving public access to information.147
Accordingly, courts should apply transformativeness as a means of
identifying either a group- or society-based public interest. For example, by
first recognizing the new functions that Google Library added to the books
it reproduced, the U.S. courts considered how such transformative uses could
bring about a society-based public interest. Consequently, they treated
Google Library as itself constituting a technological breakthrough in opening
up new functions for books. More importantly, they also regarded it as a
scheme for enhancing the societal interests in knowledge acquisition and
sharing through such technological progress.
However, the utilization of transformativeness does not foreclose the
possibility of any inquiry into whether a non-transformative use furthers the
public interest identified through the group- and society-based approach.
Instead, courts still enjoy the latitude to consider how and why a nontransformative use promotes a group- or society-based public interest. As
discussed earlier, the U.S. court rulings on HathiTrust Digital Library
exemplify such an application of the group- and society-based approach.
Courts determined that HathiTrust’s non-transformative use served the
interest of the print disabled as a group of readers in accessing books.148
B. Significant Market Substitution
The second component of the public interest principle, as suggested in
Part II, is the application of the “significant market substitution” standard,
which should guide courts to apply the fourth factor of the fair use doctrine,
namely, “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”149 To do so, courts should exclude the public interest use
of a work from the full spectrum of the work’s market share. Put differently,
when courts deal with the fourth factor, they should require copyright holders
to legally tolerate public interest uses of their works to the extent that those
uses do not cause significant market substitutions of their works.
1. Assessing Market Harm Properly
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, an unauthorized use of a work
runs counter to the fourth factor only when it “act[s] as a substitute for”150
the work. Following from that logic, the fourth factor triggers two inquiries
147 Id. at 1165 (ruling that “a search engine provides social benefit by incorporating an original work
into a new work, namely, an electronic reference tool”).
148 See supra text accompanying notes 128–28.
149 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
150 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (deciding that “cognizable market
harm” is limited to “market substitution”).
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about how such a use would cause harm to both the current and potential
market value of the work.151 Despite the large number of fair use cases heard
over the years, uncertainty still surrounds the fourth factor itself and its
relation to the other factors.152 In Campbell, the Supreme Court attempted to
clarify, stating that “when . . . the second use is transformative, market
substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily
inferred.”153 Although this is an authoritative interpretation of the fourth
factor, the approach proffered by the Court suffers from two problems. First,
the Court did not consider whether a non-transformative use that serves the
public interest should be treated on the same footing as a transformative use
under the fourth factor.
Second and worse still, the Court utilized the copyright holder-based
approach to determine the scope of the protectable market shielded by
copyright. It correctly pointed out that a transformative use is unlikely to
cause a market substitutive effect because it “usually serve[s] different
market functions.”154 However, it erred by determining the scope of the
protectable market by whether the use would generally create or license
others to create derivative works. According to the Supreme Court, critical
review and parody do not fall within the ambit of a protectable market
because copyright holders would not license others to use their works in
those particular transformative ways.155 The Court’s treatment of a copyright
holder’s protectable market here fails to capture the essence of fair use. By
nature, fair use legally permits unauthorized uses of works in the public
interest, provided that they do not violate the fair use factors.156 Copyright
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Id. at 590 (quoting 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05(A)(4) (1993))
(concluding that under the fourth factor, courts should “consider not only the extent of market harm
caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also ‘whether unrestricted and widespread
conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the
potential market’”).
152 See Sun, supra note 3, at 290.
153 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
154 Id.; see also Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Billy Graham
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614 (2d Cir. 2006)) (“In other words, under Factor
Four, any economic ‘harm’ caused by transformative uses does not count because such uses, by definition,
do not serve as substitutes for the original work.”).
155 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (“This distinction between potentially remediable displacement and
unremediable disparagement is reflected in the rule that there is no protectible derivative market for
criticism. The market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works
would in general develop or license others to develop. Yet the unlikelihood that creators of imaginative
works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from the very
notion of a potential licensing market.”).
156 As Judge Leval correctly pointed out, it is presumptively valid for a fair use to cause a certain
amount of harm to the market value of the work concerned. He argues that “[b]y definition every fair use
involves some loss of royalty revenue because the secondary user has not paid royalties. . . . [I]f an
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holders are not supposed to enjoy proprietary control over all public interest
uses of their works through any of their potential licensing arrangements.157
Such proprietary control, regardless of whether it incentivizes copyright
holders to create works, would be detrimental to public interest protection.158
Third, when it comes to fair use such as a critical comment on or parody
of a work, neither of these public interest uses of the work would
significantly substitute its market because those uses serve the public interest
in openly discussing issues relating to the work. They do not intend to replace
sales of the work in the marketplace. From this perspective, courts do not
need to consider whether the copyright holder would license others to use
the work for the purpose of critical review or parody.159 Therefore, the fourth
factor should be read as having already divorced public interest uses from
the market of copyright holders. What courts should consider under the
fourth factor is whether public interest uses of works would in turn
significantly substitute the market of those works. If they would, then courts

insubstantial loss of revenue turned the fourth factor in favor of the copyright holder, this factor would
never weigh in favor of the secondary user.” Leval, supra note 103, at 1124–25.
157 Professor Shyamkrishna Balganesh argues that it is legally and socially undesirable to define an
overly broad scope of copyright, thereby allowing copyright holders to control market share to an extent
that disincentivizes them to create new works. Hence, he concludes that “[c]opyright . . . needs to
internalize the idea that incentives have limits and develop a mechanism by which to eliminate
unincentivized gains from a creator’s entitlement, especially when including them in the entitlement is
likely to produce more costs than benefits.” Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright
Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1574 (2009). He further contends that the conventional practice of
fair use has allowed copyright holders to “internalize all possible benefits, until the fair use determination
concludes otherwise.” Id. at 1585. Therefore, as he further points out, “[i]n focusing on this presumptive
entitlement by itself, fair use does very little in practice to link the defendant’s actions (that is, copying)
with the creator’s original incentive.” Id.
158 According to Professor Mark Lemley, all “[e]fforts to permit [copyright] owners to fully
internalize the benefits of their creativity [through their proprietary control] will inevitably get the balance
[of copyright protection] wrong.” Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2005). Professor James Boyle also points out that fair use serves as a limitation
on the scope of copyrights. See JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE
MIND 66 (2008) (“When society hands out the right to the copyright holder, it carves out certain areas of
use and refuse to hand over control of them.”).
159 See, e.g., William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 10:151 (2018) (“Too broad an interpretation of
the potential market, however, presents its own considerable dangers. If taken to a logical extreme, the
fourth factor would always weigh against fair use since there is always a potential market that the
copyright owner could in theory license.”) (citations omitted); Rebecca Tushnet, Content, Purpose, or
Both, 90 WASH. L. REV. 869, 891(2015) (“Transformativeness, despite its potential ambiguities, has the
capacity to recognize the uses that we find valuable and that we believe copyright owners shouldn’t
control.”).
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are very likely to rule in favor of the copyright holders.160 If they would not,
courts are very likely to rule in favor of users.161
The significant market substitution standard can resolve the
aforementioned problems through a new approach that directly allows courts
to exclude a public interest use of a work that is permissible under the first
fair use factor from the ambit of the work’s market under the fourth factor.
Stemming from the public interest principle, the significant market
substitution standard guides courts to more effectively weigh the extent of
market harm. To that end, it requires courts to utilize public interest
considerations in evaluating the harm to a work’s current and potential
market value. If courts can identify a public interest use under the first fair
use factor, they should then apply the significant market substitution
standard, which sets a higher threshold for establishing market harm.
The Second Circuit ruling in the Google Library case sheds light on
how this new standard can be applied. Although the fourth fair use factor is
intended to protect the market value of a work, the Second Circuit examined
it in light of public interest considerations and then applied the significant
market substitution standard, which allows the public to benefit from limited
uses of copyrighted works to the extent that such uses do not exert a
significant substitutive effect on those works’ market value. The Second
Circuit stated:
We recognize that the snippet function can cause some loss of sales. There are
surely instances in which a searcher’s need for access to a text will be satisfied
by the snippet view, resulting in either the loss of a sale to that searcher, or
reduction of demand on libraries for that title, which might have resulted in
libraries purchasing additional copies. But the possibility, or even the
probability or certainty, of some loss of sales does not suffice to make the copy
an effectively competing substitute that would tilt the weighty fourth factor in
favor of the rights holder in the original. There must be a meaningful or

160

See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593 (“Evidence of substantial harm to [a derivative market] would
weigh against a finding of fair use.”); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539,
566–67 (1985) (“Fair use, when properly applied, is limited to copying by others which does not
materially impair the marketability of the work which is copied.”); Cambridge University Press v. Patton,
769 F.3d 1232, 1276 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The central question under the fourth factor is not whether
Defendants’ use of Plaintiffs’ works caused Plaintiffs to lose some potential revenue. Rather, it is whether
Defendants’ use—taking into account the damage that might occur if ‘everybody did it’—would cause
substantial economic harm such that allowing it would frustrate the purposes of copyright by materially
impairing Defendants’ incentive to publish the work.”).
161 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454 (1984) (ruling that fair
use “requires the copyright holder to demonstrate some likelihood of harm”); Authors Guild v. Google,
Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 224 (2d Cir. 2015) (deciding that a violation of the fourth fair use factor could be
found if the defendant caused “a meaningful or significant effect” on the market value of the plaintiff’
work).
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significant effect “upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.”162

Here, the Second Circuit filled the vacuum left by the Supreme Court’s
Campbell ruling, casting new light on how to ascertain the probability of
market substitution in light of the public interest principle. The Second
Circuit was fully aware of instances in which the provision of snippet views
by Google Library would cause some loss of sales to the affected works.
However, it ruled that such market harm is nonetheless permitted under the
fair use doctrine as long as it does not lead to “meaningful or significant”163
market substitution of the works. In other words, the fair use doctrine
tolerates a moderate degree of market harm caused by a transformative use
that is socially beneficial. The doctrine protects such a socially beneficial use
as long as it does not cause market harm sufficient to significantly replace
the copyright holder’s work in the marketplace. With regard to a nontransformative use that protects the public interest, the Second Circuit
decided that copyright holders should not be vested with market control over
their works to the extent that those works are used by digital libraries
providing the print disabled with access to them.164
To follow the public interest principle, courts should first determine
whether the use of a work is socially beneficial, and then ensure that such
use would not cause significant market substitution.165 Again, the Second
Circuit showed how courts should handle these two steps in weighing the
fourth factor. For the first step, the Second Circuit concluded that snippet
views promote the public interest in locating information, such as a historical
fact that is not protected by copyright law. It offered the plausible case of a
student writing a research paper who would benefit from the snippet view of
The Making of Franklin D. Roosevelt generated by the entry of search words
to discover the historical fact that Roosevelt had been stricken with polio.166
With regard to the second step, the Second Circuit found that snippet views
of copyrighted books did not cause significant market substitution to the
162

Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 224.
Id.
164 See Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 103 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The fourth factor also weighs
in favor of a finding of fair use. It is undisputed that the present-day market for books accessible to the
handicapped is so insignificant that ‘it is common practice in the publishing industry for authors to forgo
royalties that are generated through the sale of books manufactured in specialized formats for the blind
. . . .’” (quoting Final Form Br. and Special App. for Pls.-Appellants at *34)).
165 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects Bearing on Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 615, 633 (2015)
(“[T]here may be societal benefits from a use without concomitant market benefits to the copyright owner,
but when there are market benefits to the copyright owner, there tends also to be societal benefit. All in
all, policies weighing in favor of fair use suggest that market benefits to the copyright holder offer a signal
that there is a societal benefit favoring fair use, which might also benefit the copyright holder.”).
166 Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 224.
163
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books because Google had endeavored to make those views short, disjointed,
and incomplete.167
2. Evaluating Market Harm but Not Benefits
In weighing the fourth fair use factor, some U.S. courts have considered
the benefits that the authorized use of a work can confer upon its market
value. For example, the District Court approvingly weighed the market
benefits accrued from Google Library in its assessment of the fourth factor.168
A number of leading commentators have contended that both the Supreme
Court’s fair use rulings and practical needs lend support to a consideration
of market benefits.169 As shown in the preceding subsection, however, the
significant market substitution standard does not necessitate judicial inquiry
into whether the unauthorized use of a work may benefit its market value.
Instead, it requires courts only to evaluate the harm to the work’s market
value caused by the unauthorized use.170
Contrary to these commentators’ inference from leading precedents, the
U.S. Supreme Court’s fair use rulings should not be read as providing
judicial support for a consideration of market benefits under the fourth factor.
In Sony, the Court did turn its attention to how the reproduction of works for
the time-shifting purpose conferred market benefits upon the copyright
holder concerned and public benefits in the form of wider access to television

167

Id. at 224–25.
See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s images
in thumbnail version in the defendant’s search engine brought benefits to the plaintiff); Nat’l Ctr. for
Jewish Film v. Riverside Films, LLC, No. 5:12-cv-00044-ODW (DTBx), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131831,
at *13-14 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2012) (ruling in favor of the defendants because their films would cause
“a newfound interest in Plaintiff’s copyrighted films”).
169 See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 165, at 641 (“In sum, Campbell’s fair use analysis ought to be read
to require consideration of both market harms and benefits—so long as these harms and benefits surpass
a certain degree of speculativeness—to determine the market effects bearing on fair use. The statute,
copyright policy, and business realities justify this understanding of the fourth fair use factor.”); Pamela
Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 815, 823 (2015) (“After Campbell, it is
acceptable for courts to take into account possible market benefits of a defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s
work in weighing market effects, not just possible negative effects. Campbell has opened the door to
considering possible benefits and harms together in a holistic way, as well as in relation to the other
factors.”).
170
See, e.g., 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1305[A][4] (2018)
(“The fourth factor looks to adverse impact only by reason of usurpation of the demand for plaintiff’s
work through defendant’s copying of protectable expression from such work.”); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.
Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (ruling that fair use defenses should “look to . . . the degree in which
the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”);
Wendy J. Gordon, The Concept of “Harm” in Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON LAW 30 n.81 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2015) (“The fourth fair use factor . . . has been
interpreted both as referring to plaintiff’s private harm, and as referring to impact on incentives.”).
168
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programs.171 However, it then shifted its attention and emphasized that what
the fourth factor really requires is for a copyright holder to “demonstrate
some likelihood of harm” to refute the contention that a reproduction of his
or her work constituted a fair use.172 Without weighing up whether the said
market benefits could mitigate the potential market harm, the Court then
directly concluded that the copyright holders in question had failed to prove
on the merit of the fourth factor that the reproduction at issue had “cause[d]
any likelihood of nonminimal harm to the potential market for, or the value
of, their copyrighted works.”173 Relying on Sony, the Supreme Court later
asserted in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises that inquiry
into the fourth factor is concerned merely with market harm.174 It did not
consider whether the unauthorized publication of excerpts from former
President Nixon’s memoirs had produced market benefits by bringing the
public’s attention to the memoirs prior to their publication. Instead, the Court
implied that it was improper to consider market benefits.175
Similarly, the Campbell ruling should not be read as setting a precedent
on judicial consideration of market benefits under the fourth factor. In a
footnote to its ruling, the Court offered the following analysis:
Even favorable evidence, without more, is no guarantee of fairness. Judge Leval
gives the example of the film producer’s appropriation of a composer’s
previously unknown song that turns the song into a commercial success; the
boon to the song does not make the film’s simple copying fair. This factor, no
less than the other three, may be addressed only through a “sensitive balancing
of interests.” Market harm is a matter of degree, and the importance of this
factor will vary, not only with the amount of harm, but also with the relative
strength of the showing on the other factors.176

To some commentators, this observation is the epitome of the Supreme
Court’s endorsement for incorporating a consideration of market benefits
into analysis of the fourth factor.177 In my opinion, however, the observation
is not intended to open the door to any such additional consideration for
several reasons.
171

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454 (1984).
Id.
173 Id. at 456.
174 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985) (“This inquiry must take account not only of harm to the original but
also of harm to the market for derivative works.”).
175 The Court ruled that “[a]ny copyright infringer may claim to benefit the public by increasing
public access to the copyrighted work. But Congress has not designed, and we see no warrant for
judicially imposing, a ‘compulsory license’ permitting unfettered access to the unpublished copyrighted
expression of public figures.” Id. at 569 (citations omitted).
176 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 n.21 (citations omitted).
177 See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 165, at 629.
172
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First, despite its mention of “the boon” to the copyright holder’s market,
the Court did not examine the market benefits of parodies that accrued to
copyright holders, as commentators have alleged.178 Rather, it solely
analyzed the various scenarios in which parodies might cause harm to
copyright holders and then decided to insulate the fourth factor from
consideration of those hypothetical harms.179
Second, by the “sensitive balancing of interests” quoted from Sony, the
Court did not intend to weigh both the positive benefits and harmful effects
that an unauthorized use could bring to a copyright holder’s market. Instead,
it meant to show its concurrence with the part of the Sony ruling in which
interests were weighed under the confluence of all four fair use factors,180 the
first factor in particular.181
Third, when the Court concluded that the degree of market harm must
be balanced with “the other factors,” it was by no means referring to market
benefits as factors. Again, it situated its analysis of market harm in the
scrutiny of transformativeness under the first factor. Indeed, the Court made
it crystal clear that transformativeness serves as a countervailing
consideration against the market harm assessment under the fourth factor.182
On the other hand, the proposed consideration of market benefits is
fraught with problems, making its incorporation into application of the fourth
factor undesirable indeed. First, measuring market benefits is infeasible in
practice. Virtually any unauthorized use of a work could hypothetically
benefit the copyright holder to a certain extent. For example, as unauthorized
uses can promote the visibility or popularity of a work to various degrees,183
they might result in increased sales for the copyright holder.184 However, it
Id. (arguing that “the Court hints that some parodies might even confer market benefits”).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591–92 (“Indeed, as to parody pure and simple, it is more likely that the
new work will not affect the market for the original in a way cognizable under this factor, that is, by
acting as a substitute for it. . . . We do not, of course, suggest that a parody may not harm the market at
all, but when a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the original, it does not
produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.”).
180 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454–55 (1984) (“When [fair
use] factors are all weighed in the ‘equitable rule of reason’ balance, we must conclude that this record
amply supports the District Court’s conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use.”).
181 In footnote 40 of the Sony ruling that the Court cited, it was stated that courts should particularly
weigh the first factor which triggers an inquiry of the character of use as being productive and
nonproductive with the fourth factor. Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40.
182 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (ruling that “when . . . the second use is transformative, market
substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred.”).
183 See David Fagundes, Market Harm, Market Help, and Fair Use, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 359,
379 (2014) (“Infringement can, however counterintuitively, serve as a source of publicity and drive up
demand in a way that more than makes up for the lost sales of some copies.”).
184 Judge Leval gives an example how “[q]uotation of the original may substantially augment its
value and yet be a clear infringement.” He pointed out that “[t]his would occur, for example, if a famous
178
179
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would be difficult indeed to put an exact figure on such benefits, and it would
be nearly impossible to calculate exactly how many people purchased a
given work because an authorized copy thereof had aroused their interest.
Nor would it be an easy task to measure the reputational benefits accruing to
a work through an unauthorized use.185 More difficult still would be to
calculate those benefits in dollars. Given these difficulties, it would be
unrealistic to determine the market benefits to a work first and then weigh
those benefits against the market harm.
Second, the proposed separation between market benefits and harm is
likely to be circular in nature, which may result in unintended negative
consequences for copyright holders. Market benefits, if ascertained
exogenously without taking a closer look at copyright holders’ legitimate
intentions, are in turn very likely to be harmful to their interests protected
under the fourth factor. In these circumstances, so-called market benefits
would actually equate to market harm to copyright holders. Monge v. Maya
Magazines, Inc.186 epitomizes just this kind of adverse circumstance for
copyright holders. The defendant, Maya Magazines, had published photos of
the wedding of the Monges, a celebrity couple who wished to keep their
marriage secret. Before the unauthorized publication, Maya Magazines had
bought the photos in question from the Monges’ chauffeur, who had tried but
failed to extort money from the Monges for the photos’ return. Maya
Magazines’ publication of the photos might have been considered to confer
market benefits on the couple by increasing demand for their wedding photos
and other photos and burnishing their reputation as celebrities. However, it
is crystal clear that the Monges never wished to enjoy such questionable
benefits, having vehemently objected to any publication of their wedding
photos. Hence, the wider the circulation of the photos, the greater the harm—
rather than benefits—inflicted upon them.
There were two kinds of harm to the Monges associated directly with
the market benefits derived from the unauthorized initial publication of the
photos and their subsequent circulation. First, there was significant market
harm caused directly to their proprietary control over the market for their

disc jockey, without authorization, regularly used an obscure song as the theme melody of her program.
The value of the copyright for the song would be greatly enhanced.” Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture:
Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1459 (1997); see also Patry, supra note 159, § 6:14 (pointing
out that “a search engine’s retrieval and display of excerpts from a copyrighted book will likely lead to
increased sales, as well as providing valuable information to the individual who initiated the query”).
185 Similarly, a search engine’s reproduction and display of a work may increase the reputation of
the work on the Internet.
186 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012).
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wedding photos,187 as their publication limited the couple’s exercise of their
exclusive right to publish,188 further distribute,189 and prepare derivative
works.190 Second, there was indirect harm to other of the Monges’ personal
interests relating to the market for their wedding photos. The forced opening
up of that market by Maya Magazines not only impinged upon their privacy
but also negatively affected their reputation as unmarried celebrities.191 All
in all, Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc. demonstrates the infeasibility of
considering market benefits under the fourth factor, given that such
“benefits” can in reality impose harm on copyright holders if their works are
being used in a manner contrary to their legitimate intentions.
Hence, I agree with commentators who state that courts should consider
the larger social benefits accruing from unauthorized uses of a work,192 but
respectfully disagree with them that such benefits should be considered
under the fourth fair use factor. Instead, social benefits should be considered
under the first fair use factor with the public interest use standard I suggest
above.

187 In my view, it would have been better for courts to rule that the unauthorized initial publication
concerned caused harm to the right to control the market for the photos rather than to the photos’ potential
market value. Such an approach would have alleviated any doubt over whether the copyright holders in
the case had any wish to publish their photos, meaning that the photos’ potential market value was
uncertain. The right to control the market for a work does not require consideration of the potential value
of that market. For the court’s ruling in this regard, see id. at 1182 (“Maya’s un-authorized ‘first and
exclusive’ publication of the images substantially harmed the potential market because the publication
directly competed with, and completely usurped, the couple’s potential market for first publication of the
photos.”).
188 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2018). The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that “Clause (3) of section 106,
establishes the exclusive right of publications. . . . Under this provision the copyright owner would have
the right to control the first public distribution of an authorized copy . . . of his work” Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) (citing H.R.Rep. No. 94–1476, p. 62 (1976),
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1976, p. 5675). It also ruled that “[t]he right of first publication
encompasses not only the choice whether to publish at all, but also the choices of when, where, and in
what form first to publish a work.” Id. at 564.
189 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
190 Id. § 106(2).
191 See Patrick R. Goold, Unbundling the ‘Tort’ of Copyright Infringement, 102 VA. L. REV. 1833,
1837 (2016) (finding that “[w]hile some courts conceptualize harm as lost revenue from the defendant,
others require proof of consumer demand diversion, and occasionally courts also find a cognizable
nonfinancial injury to privacy, reputation, or creative control”); David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of
Harm in Copyright, 30 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 421, 422 (1983) (pointing out that “[t]he [mere] notion
of economic “harm” as a prerequisite for copyright protection is mischievous”); cf. Gordon, supra note
170, at 51 (“Subjective distress may be ‘harm’ in some contexts, such as the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, but should not count as such in copyright.”).
192 See Fromer, supra note 165, at 633 (concluding that “there may be societal benefits from a use
without concomitant market benefits to the copyright owner, but when there are market benefits to the
copyright owner, there tends also to be societal benefit”).
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IV. MODIFYING THE PROCEDURAL RULE BY REALLOCATING THE BURDEN
OF PROOF
The assignment of burden of proof is of critical importance.193 In some
circumstances, it can determine the outcome of a fair use case, thereby
profoundly affecting protection of the public interest. For example, as
discussed in Part II, the Chinese courts placed the burden of proving fair use
on the accused infringers in copyright disputes. Therefore, the Beijing High
Court simply rejected Google’s assertion of fair use on the grounds that the
company had failed to submit evidence proving fair use.194 By strictly
following such a procedural rule, the Court failed to consider any public
interests involved in the provision of Google Library. At the same time,
although the U.S. courts properly protected the public interest in the Google
Library case, there are still problems with the fair use doctrine they invoked,
specifically with their procedural treatment of fair use as an affirmative
defense.
In this part of the paper, I first identify the major inadequacies of
assigning the burden of proof in the way required by the affirmative defense
approach to fair use. I then explore how the public interest principle can lead
to the redefinition of fair use as a collective user right, thereby triggering a
major modification of the procedural rule for burden of proof allocation. I
argue that users should be required to bear only the burden of proving
whether their use meets the first fair use factor, the public interest use
standard thereunder in particular. When it comes to the three other fair use
factors, copyright holders should shoulder the burden of proof.
A. Major Problem with the Affirmative Defense Approach
Under the fair use doctrine, the burden of proving fair use is placed on
the alleged infringers who have used copyrighted works.195 In Harper &
Row, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court treated fair use as “an affirmative
defense requiring a case-by-case analysis,”196 thereby refuting the existence
of presumptive categories of fair use.197 In Campbell, the Court further
clarified that “[s]ince fair use is an affirmative defense, its proponent[s]

193 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright as Market Prospect, 166 U. P A. L. REV. 443, 497 (2018)
(“A major unresolved controversy of some significance in copyright jurisprudence is whether fair use
should be a part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, or instead an affirmative defense.”).
194 See MERGES & SONG, supra note 42, at 456.
195 See Sun, supra note 1, at 146 (“By treating fair use as an affirmative defense, courts place the
burden of proving fair use on the allegedly infringing users in copyright disputes.”).
196 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985).
197 Id. (“The drafters resisted pressures from special interest groups to create presumptive categories
of fair use, but structured the provision as an affirmative defense requiring a case-by-case analysis.”).
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would have . . . the burden of demonstrating fair use.”198 Following this
judicial characterization of fair use as an affirmative defense,199 users are
procedurally required to bear the burden of producing the requisite evidence
and persuading courts that said evidence is sufficiently probative to
demonstrate that their use of the copyrighted work in question satisfies all
fair use factors.200 In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,201 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit further explicated the way in which the
burden of proving fair use should be handled as a matter of procedure in the
different stages of judicial proceedings:
At trial, the defendant in an infringement action bears the burden of proving fair
use. Because “the burdens at the preliminary injunction stage track the burdens
at trial,” once the moving party has carried its burden of showing a likelihood
of success on the merits, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show a
likelihood that its affirmative defense will succeed.202

Placing the burden of proving fair use on users as an affirmative
defense, however, has given rise to a number of unintended negative
consequences. First, users are not by any means in a better position to prove
the fourth fair use factor, which in many cases is the key determining factor
in the case outcome. The U.S. Supreme Court has exhibited sympathy for
the difficulty defendants experience in obtaining sufficient evidence to prove
fair use under the fourth factor.203 However, it has not reversed the burden of
proof by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate market harm. Instead, it has

198

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
See, e.g., Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1307
n.21 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The affirmative defense of fair use is a mixed question of law and fact as to which
the proponent carries the burden of proof.”); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 918
(2d Cir. 1994) (“Fair use serves as an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement, and thus
the party claiming that its secondary use of the original copyrighted work constitutes a fair use typically
carries the burden of proof as to all issues in the dispute.”); Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Miramax Films
Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1187 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that “because fair use is an affirmative
defense, Defendants bear the burden of proof on all of its factors”).
200 See Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
1781, 1784 (2010) (pointing out that to prove the existence of fair use, a user is required to “produce the
necessary evidence (even where the inquiry is speculative) and to persuade the court that her interpretation
of the evidence reflects fact (even where the inquiry is subjective)”).
201 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
202 Id. at 1158 (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
429 (2006)).
203 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (“Since fair use is an affirmative defense, its proponent would have
difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating fair use without favorable evidence about relevant
markets.”) (citation omitted).
199
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merely defied practice to presume market harm if a commercial use is
found.204
Second, the affirmative defense approach places an onerous procedural
burden on users, which may deter members of the public from asserting their
fair use privilege. A fair use inquiry is a complex combination of law and
fact without bright line rules.205 As a highly sophisticated body of copyright
law, the fair use doctrine is known for its ambiguity, with all four fair use
factors still ill-defined.206 Therefore, defendants must rely on legal
professionals to assist them with collecting and then utilizing evidence to
demonstrate that a fair use claim prevails on the basis of all four factors.
Because of these onerous procedural and evidentiary requirements, the
process of proving fair use is very likely to incur a six-figure attorney fee.207
Faced with the high cost of defending the fair use privilege, users,
particularly the less well-off and not-for-profit entities, may prove unwilling
to assert the legality of their uses before courts. 208 Consequently,
commentators have lamented that fair use has been unduly reduced to “the
right to hire a lawyer to defend [one’s] right to create.”209
Third, the affirmative defense approach has impaired such public
interests as free speech and education, which are crucial to a free and equal
society. Free speech activities, to a greater or lesser extent, involve the
copying of copyrighted works.210 In the various stages of copyright litigation
proceedings—from the preliminary injunction to courtroom hearing to
voluntary settlement—the difficulty of collecting evidence to prove market
harm and the high litigation costs involved impose an undue burden on users

204 Id. at 591 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984))
(distinguishing Sony’s ruling that “[i]f the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be
presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated”).
205 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (“Fair use is a mixed
question of law and fact.”).
206 See, e.g., Sun, supra note 3, at 291 (“Judging from section 107’s legislative purpose and structure
and the discrepancies in courts’ approaches to apply the four factors, the fair use doctrine is indeed vague,
flexible and open-ended.”).
207 See, e.g., Kevin M. Lemley, I’ll Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: A Proposed Model for
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Intellectual Property Disputes, 37 AKRON L. REV. 287, 311 (2004)
(“Intellectual property litigation typically spans several years with total costs commonly exceeding
hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars. A 2001 survey . . . calculated the average cost through
trial of typical patent disputes . . . at $1,499,000; $699,000 for similar trade secret disputes; $502,000 for
trademark disputes; and $400,000 for copyright disputes.”) (footnotes omitted).
208 See, e.g., Sun, supra note 1, at 192; James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in
Intellectual Property Law, 116 Yale L.J. 882, 890 (2007).
209 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY 187 (2004).
210 See Tushnet, supra note 106, at 567.
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who wish to defend their free speech right.211 Worse still, the fear of failing
to tackle such difficulties successfully might deter people from asserting
their free speech right even prior to the commencement of judicial
proceedings. The affirmative defense approach can therefore exert a chilling
effect on free speech in everyday life.212 Such a chilling effect can also be
seen in educational settings, raising serious concerns over whether fair use
can deliver on its promise to promote education.213
B. Transforming Fair Use into a Collective User Right
In response to the problems with reducing fair use to an affirmative
defense, several commentators have contended that the nature of fair use
should be redefined in line with the legislative intent of Section 107 of the
U.S. Copyright Act, which governs fair use analysis.214 At the same time, the
redefinition should also alleviate the burden on users of proving fair use. 215
Although such an approach has merit, I believe that a better approach would
be to follow the public interest principle by redefining fair use as a collective
user right and subsequently reallocating the burden of proof between the user
and copyright holder.
1. Fair Use as a Statutory Right
By characterizing fair use as an affirmative defense, the U.S. courts
have turned a blind eye to the statutory definition of fair use. The U.S.
Copyright Act explicitly embraces fair use as a statutory right. Section 108
states that “[n]othing in this section . . . in any way affects the right of fair
use as provided by section 107, or any contractual obligations assumed at
any time by the library or archives when it obtained a copy or phonorecord
of a work in its collections.”216 As this statutory language is crystal clear, fair
use should be regarded as a right.
211

Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH L. REV. 685, 691, 709–10
(2015) (“Treating fair use as an affirmative defense places an unnecessary and inappropriate burden on
free speech. Placing the burden of proving or disproving fair use may play a significant role in the
outcome of a litigated case at a variety of stages, from the issuance of a preliminary injunction to the
ultimate determination of infringement liability. And, of course, who bears the burden of proving a use
was (or was not) a fair use affects the settlement posture of the parties, as well as the behavior of potential
fair users even prior to the filing or threat of litigation.”) (citation omitted).
212 Id. at 710; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After
Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 719–22 (2003) (arguing that placing the
burden of proof on the defendant violates due process First Amendment due process rights).
213 See, e.g., Sun, supra note 3, at 321–22.
214 Loren, supra note 211, at 695 (“The committee believes that any special statutory provision
placing the burden of proving fair use on one side or the other would be unfair and undesirable.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
215 Id. at 702.
216 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (2012).

164

16:123 (2019)

Copyright Law as an Engine of Public Interest Protection

However, what remains unclear is whether it is a substantive,
procedural right, or both. As a substantive right, fair use is more akin to a
positive right.217 It is supposed to entitle members of the public to make fair
use of copyrighted works on their own decisions. As a procedural right,
however, fair use serves as a negative right entitling a user to sufficient
judicial protection in various stages of legal proceedings that prevent
copyright holders from unduly interfering with fair use.218 According to a
report by the U.S. Copyright Office, Sections 107 and 108 define fair use as
a substantive right. The report further reads Section 108 as a “fair use savings
clause,” entitling “libraries and archives to make fair use of works to the
same extent as any other user of a copyrighted work” under Section 107.219
Therefore, fair use is a substantive right that entitles the public to take the
positive action of using a work without permission from the copyright
holder.220
2. Fair Use as a Judicially Recognized Right
Because fair use has been judicially defined as an affirmative defense,
courts have increasingly deviated from the practice of considering fair use as
a substantive, positive right. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit actually ventured to redefine fair use as an “affirmative right” in its
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. ruling.221 In that case, the Eleventh
Circuit grounded the fair use right in the constitutional right to free speech
under the First Amendment:
[F]air use should be considered an affirmative right under the 1976 Act, rather
than merely an affirmative defense, as it is defined in the Act as a use that is not
a violation of copyright. However, fair use is commonly referred to as an
affirmative defense, and, as we are bound by Supreme Court precedent, we will
apply it as such. Nevertheless, the fact that the fair use right must be
procedurally asserted as an affirmative defense does not detract from its

217 Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 178 (2002) (“The ‘positive’ sense of the word
‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and
decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind.”).
218 Id. at 174 (“The defence of liberty consists in the ‘negative’ goal of warding off interference.”).
219 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECTION 108 OF TITLE 17, at 9 (2017), https://www.copyright.gov/
policy/section108/discussion-document.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NU3-R32U].
220 Loren, supra note 211, at 698 (“The language of Section 108, identifying the ‘right of fair use,’
furthers the textual argument that the statute does not treat fair use as an affirmative defense in the style
of ‘confession and avoidance.’ A defense is any reason that the plaintiff should not prevail. On the other
hand, an affirmative defense is relevant only once the plaintiff’s prima facie case has been proven. If fair
use is ‘not an infringement,’ then the plaintiff has not met its burden to demonstrate a prima facie case of
infringement without overcoming the argument that the use is a fair use.”) (citations omitted).
221 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
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constitutional significance as a guarantor to access and use for First Amendment
purposes.222

Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also
attempted to redefine fair use as a right in NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Institute,
undergirding that right with the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution:
Fair use is not a doctrine that exists by sufferance, or that is earned by good
works and clean morals; it is a right—codified in § 107 and recognized since
shortly after the Statute of Anne—that is “necessary to fulfill copyright’s very
purpose, [t]o promote the Progress of science and the useful arts . . . .”223

The foregoing quote from the Copyright Clause is largely understood
to justify copyright protection as a means to the end of promoting the public
interest. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts alike
have repeatedly stressed that protection of the public interest is the primary
objective of U.S. copyright law.224 Therefore, as long as fair use is invoked
in the public interest, copyright law should also protect it as a positive
right.225

222

Id. at 1260 n.3 (citations omitted). In this footnote, the judge cited Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc.,
79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996), which also defined fair use as a right:
Although the traditional approach is to view “fair use” as an affirmative defense, this writer,
speaking only for himself, is of the opinion that it is better viewed as a right granted by the
Copyright Act of 1976. Originally, as a judicial doctrine without any statutory basis, fair use was
an infringement that was excused—this is presumably why it was treated as a defense. As a
statutory doctrine, however, fair use is not an infringement. Thus, since the passage of the 1976
Act, fair use should no longer be considered an infringement to be excused; instead, it is logical
to view fair use as a right. Regardless of how fair use is viewed, it is clear that the burden of
proving fair use is always on the putative infringer.
Id. at 1542 n.22.
223 364 F.3d 471, 485 (2d Cir. 2004) (Jacobs, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994)).
224 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (“From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity
for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . ‘”) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8); Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (holding
that “[t]he primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.’) (citations omitted). For similar judicial opinions, see Fogerty v.
Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
429 (1984); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); U.S. v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); Computer
Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992).
225 Patry, supra note 159, § 10:1.50 (2018) (“‘Limitations and exceptions to copyright,’ a phrase
much in current use, posits the issue backwards; that phrase assumes a grant of rights that is checked only
on occasion, and in derogation of a presumed default of unfettered rights. Limitations and exceptions will
be allowed, it is argued, if there is a public interest that justifies overriding the private rights of authors
in their works in particular circumstances.”).
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In attempting to redefine fair use as a right, courts did not further
propose altering the procedural rules for fair use cases by shifting the burden
of proving fair use to the plaintiff.226 Nevertheless, in Lenz v. Universal Music
Corp.,227 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided to deviate
from the affirmative defense approach:
[Characterizing fair use as an affirmative defense] conflates two different
concepts: an affirmative defense that is labeled as such due to the procedural
posture of the case, and an affirmative defense that excuses impermissible
conduct. Supreme Court precedent squarely supports the conclusion that fair
use does not fall into the latter camp: “[A]nyone who . . . makes a fair use of
the work is not an infringer of the copyright with respect to such use.” Given
that 17 U.S.C. § 107 expressly authorizes fair use, labeling it as an affirmative
defense that excuses conduct is a misnomer. . . .228

This treatment of fair use fundamentally departs from the conventional
reading of fair use as an affirmative defense that “excuses impermissible
conduct.” The Ninth Circuit grounded its opinion in fair use as a concept
legally permitting the public to use copyrighted works, a concept deeply
ingrained in copyright law. Given that the public is entitled to make legally
permitted uses, copyright holders cannot unduly interfere unless uses go
beyond the bounds set in Section 107. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
implicitly proffers a legal basis for treating fair use as a substantive positive
right under Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Act.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit moved to explicitly accept fair use as a
right.229 The court considered and agreed with the opinion of Judge Birch that
fair use should be treated as a right rather than an affirmative defense, and
subsequently altered the burden of proving fair use in notice-and-takedown
proceedings.230 The Ninth Circuit required the copyright holder in question
to evaluate whether a fair use of his work existed before he sent a takedown
notice to an Internet service provider. A normal takedown notice requires
proof of the non-existence of fair use from the copyright holder not the
user.231

226

See, e.g., Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 (11th Cir. 1996).
815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2015).
228 Id. at 1152–53 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit also concluded that “[f]air use is therefore
distinct from affirmative defenses where a use infringes a copyright, but there is no liability due to a valid
excuse, e.g., misuse of a copyright and laches.” Id. at 1153.
229 Id. at 1153.
230 Id.
231 Id. (holding “that because 17 U.S.C. § 107 created a type of non-infringing use, fair use is
‘authorized by the law’ and a copyright holder must consider the existence of fair use before sending a
takedown notification under § 512(c).”).
227
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At the same time, the treatment of fair use as a user right also gains
strong support from several Canadian court rulings defining the Canadian
fair dealing doctrine as equivalent to the fair use doctrine. In CCH Canadian
Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada,232 for example, the Supreme Court of
Canada delivered a groundbreaking opinion on the nature of fair dealing. It
decided that the fair dealing doctrine under the Canadian Copyright Act
should be regarded as “a user’s right.”233 For that purpose, the doctrine “must
not be interpreted restrictively”234 so as to achieve balanced protection of the
rights of both copyright holder and user. In a subsequent case, the Supreme
Court further justified its definition of fair dealing as a user right on the
grounds of public interest protection, stating that “users’ rights are an
essential part of furthering the public interest objectives of the [Canadian]
Copyright Act.”235
3. Fair Use as a Collective User Right
As discussed above, I believe it is legally sound to treat fair use as a
user right according to the plain language of the U.S. Copyright Act and the
growing tendency among circuit courts to depart from the affirmative
defense approach. There has also been a surge in commentators adamantly
arguing the case for redefining fair use as a user right.236
In my view, the public interest principle requires fair use to be treated
as a collective user right. As discussed in Section A of Part III, according to
that principle, only public interest uses that comport with group or societal
interests are protected by the fair use right.237 Therefore, such public interests
are by nature collectively shared by users as members of a group or society.
Given the collective nature of users’ interests, fair use should be
232 [2004] 1 S.C.R. 399, ¶¶ 48, 51 & 63 (Can.), available at https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/
2004/2004scc13/2004scc13.html?autocompleteStr=%5B2004%5D%201%20S.C.R.%2039&autocompl
etePos=1.
233 Id. ¶ 48.
234 Id.
235 See Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36,
¶ 27 (Can.).
236 For theoretical discussion about how to treat fair use and fair dealing as a user right, see Abraham
Drassinower, Taking User Rights Seriously, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN
COPYRIGHT LAW 462, 463 (Michael Geist ed., 2005); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright in a Digital
Ecosystem: A User Rights Approach, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS
132 (Ruth Okediji, ed.) (2017); Niva Elkin-Koren, The New Frontiers of User Rights, 32 AM. UNIV. INT’L
L. REV. 1 (2016); Wendy J. Gordon & Daniel Bahls, The Public’s Rights to Fair Use: Amending Section
107 to Avoid the “Fared Use” Fallacy, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 619, 626 (2007) (“[F]air use is a ‘right’ in
all these senses: it is an existing liberty, to which the public has an enduring entitlement, and which
deserves significant weight.”); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV.
397, 426 (2003) (“Instead, the law sets entitlements to give recognition to these interests, to provide
breathing space for others to interact with copyrighted works.”).
237 See supra text accompanying notes 138–48.

168

16:123 (2019)

Copyright Law as an Engine of Public Interest Protection

characterized as a collective user right. Concomitantly, copyright holders
have a collective duty to make their works freely available to serve fair users’
right to achieve their collective interests.238 The substantive dimension of the
fair use doctrine comprises both a collective right conferred on users and a
collective duty imposed on copyright holders.
Accordingly, the public interest principle reshapes the procedural
dimension of the fair use doctrine. While serving as a substantive right, fair
use also protects users’ interests as a procedural right, which requires them
to prove that they have exercised their right within the doctrine’s ambit. In
response to users’ assertion of their right, copyright holders have a
procedural duty to prove that they are not legally required to fulfill users’
interests. The integration of users’ procedural right and copyright holders’
procedural duty thus plays a determining role in reallocating the burden of
proof in fair use cases.
As a matter of procedure, a user, as a holder of the right to fair use, only
needs to prove in judicial proceedings that he or she has exercised that right
in the public interest. In terms of the four fair use factors, therefore, the user
bears the burden of proof only under the first factor, which requires him or
her to provide evidence demonstrating that he or she used the copyrighted
work in question in the public interest. If he or she fails to meet that burden
of proof, then the use of the work will be deemed to have been made for his
or her own private interests.
At the same time, a copyright holder has a procedural duty to
demonstrate that he or she does not bear a substantive duty to fulfill the fair
use interest alleged by the user. In discharging that duty, he or she bears the
burden of proving that the use made of his or her work in the public or private
interest has exceeded the ambit of the fair use doctrine. Accordingly, the
burden of proof for the three other fair use factors, particularly the fourth
factor concerning market harm, is placed on the copyright holder.
Based on the public interest principle, the user right approach can
produce positive effects in protecting the public interest in fair use cases.
First, it provides a rights-based mode for protecting the public interest
procedurally, correcting the inequality in legal status caused by the
affirmative defense mode. In essence, the user right approach comports with
the procedural premise of the operation of judicial proceedings in copyright
cases.
238 According to the interest theory of rights, a person having a right to something means that the
right serves his or her interest, and meanwhile someone else has a duty to provide it. See, e.g., JOSEPH
RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 180 (1986) (“The specific role of rights in practical thinking is . . . the
grounding of duties in the interests of the other beings. . . . Rights ground requirements for action in the
interest of other beings.”).
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Normally, when a copyright holder lodges a legal complaint with a
court, he is procedurally required to prove that he or she has a right to the
work he or she created because the work is copyrightable. Similarly, when a
user claims that he or she has a fair use right, he or she needs to prove that
he or she has such a right in the sense that the use of the work is made in the
public interest. The public interest principle thus offers a procedurally equal
status to the user and the copyright holder. Each bears a substantive right in
judicial proceedings, namely, a copyright for the plaintiff and a fair use right
for the defendant. Therefore, the user right approach rectifies the inequality
in legal status under the affirmative defense mode, which regards the plaintiff
as a copyright holder but potentially discriminates against the defendant as
an alleged infringer or defense invoker who has no legal right that is
expressly recognizable under copyright law.
Second, the user right approach necessitates a corresponding procedural
duty for copyright holders, that is, a duty to prove, among other factors, that
their economic interests have been significantly harmed. Their discharge of
that duty alleviates users’ burden of proof without requiring them to prove
the non-existence of significant market harm. As noted earlier in this part,239
it is often very difficult indeed for users to prove that their uses of works do
not cause market harm. The proposed approach responds to that difficulty by
shifting the burden of proving the existence of significant market harm to
copyright holders.240 This modification of the procedural rule would in turn
protect users’ interests in two primary ways.
First, by removing the burden of proving the non-existence of market
harm from users, the user right approach procedurally implements the
requirement that copyright holders must fulfill their collective duty to serve
the public interest in using their works. To that end, they should tolerate
public interest uses to the extent required by the fair use doctrine. As
discussed in Part III, the significant market harm standard excludes public
interest uses from the scope of the market for a copyright holder’s works.241
Second, the user right approach reduces litigation costs for users because it
requires copyright holders to bear the cost of proving all fair use factors other
than the first, particularly the fourth, which requires market research and the
collection of evidence and can thus be costly. The legal fees incurred in

239

See supra text accompanying notes 203–04.
See, e.g., Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1279 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Fair use is an
affirmative defense, and the evidentiary burden on all four of its factors rests on the alleged infringer.
However, Plaintiffs—as publishers—can reasonably be expected to have the evidence as to availability
of licenses for their own works. It is therefore reasonable to place on Plaintiffs the burden of going
forward with the evidence on this question.”) (citation omitted).
241 See supra text accompanying note 149.
240

170

16:123 (2019)

Copyright Law as an Engine of Public Interest Protection

defending one’s fair use right are thus greatly reduced, meaning a user is less
likely to shy away from asserting that right for financial reasons.
In a nutshell, treating fair use as a collective user right procedurally
addresses the major problems with the affirmative defense approach.242 By
modifying the procedural rules for allocating the burden of proof, this user
right approach in turn promotes the protection of fair use as a substantive
legal right under copyright law.
C. Can Courts Protect the Public Interest Proactively?
As shown in Section C of Part II, the Beijing High Court ruled against
Google on the grounds that it had failed to fulfill its burden of proving fair
dealing. Against the backdrop of that ruling, the proposed procedural
treatment of fair use as a collective user right gives rise to concerns over
whether courts should have the power to protect the public interest
proactively, a power that has the potential to result in judicial activism and
courts abandoning their impartial role in adjudicating fair use cases. These
concerns can be encapsulated in two questions. First, can courts proactively
identify the public interests involved in the use of a work that a user has not
proved with evidence? Second, can they do so even if the user provides no
evidence of the existence of a public interest use?
These issues are of pivotal importance. Under the public interest
principle, identifying public interests in the use of copyrighted works
determines the outcome of first factor analysis. It also has direct bearing on
assessment of the fourth factor, as the scope of a copyright holder’s market
hinges upon the scope of public interest use thereunder.
A recent copyright case decided by the Beijing First Intermediate Court
casts light on how courts can deal with the two issues. In Beijing Sogou
Information Service Co., Ltd. v. Wenhui Cong, 243 the copyright holder, Mr.
Cong, lodged a complaint with the Beijing Haidian District Court alleging
that Sogou had infringed his copyright by circulating the web cache of the
webpage that originally published his article.244 The intermediate court held
that the use of the copyrighted article for web caching constituted fair use
under Chinese copyright law because Sogou’s web caching service satisfied
substantive fair use requirements and promoted the public interest. 245 This

Loren, supra note 211, at 701 (arguing that the assignment of the burden of proof “could work a
radical change in the meaning and effect of the doctrine of fair use”).
243 Beijing First Intermediate Court, 2013 Yi Zhong Min Zhong Zi No. 12533 (Dec. 10, 2013).
244 See Haochen Sun & Johnny Xuyang Han, The Scope of the Fair Use Doctrine and its Public
Interest Mandate under Chinese Copyright Law, in ANNOTATED LEADING COPYRIGHT CASES IN MAJOR
ASIAN JURISDICTIONS (Kung-Chung Liu ed.) (City University of Hong Kong Press, forthcoming 2019).
245 Id.
242
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fair use ruling was rendered without any consideration of whether the
defendant, Sogou, bore the burden of proving fair use. Sogou did not raise a
fair use defense because it claimed that it had not committed any act
tantamount to an infringement of Mr. Cong’s right to make his article
available to the public via the Internet.
Despite the defendant failing to provide any evidence proving public
interest use, the Beijing First Intermediate Court buttressed its fair use ruling
by elaborating upon such use, noting that the defendant’s web caches
contributed three indispensable public benefits. First, web caches ensure
consistency in helping users to locate information on the Internet. When
original websites cannot be loaded owing to technical or connection
difficulties, Internet users can still acquire information through the web
caches stored on servers belonging to search engine service providers.
Second, because web caches are not updated in a timely manner, Internet
users can have a quick view of them even after the relevant information has
been deleted from the original websites. Third, the defendant’s web caches
highlight the keywords that Internet users search for to enhance search
efficiency. Consequently, the Beijing First Intermediate Court proactively
examined the various public interests afforded by the defendant’s web
caching services even through the defendant had furnished no evidence
proving that those services promoted the public interest.
In my view, the Beijing First Intermediate Court acted rightly in this
case. First, when courts proactively examine the existence of a public interest
use with regard to the purpose and character of that use, they will still have
to further consider the extent to which the use harms the copyright holder’s
economic interests. Therefore, courts’ exercise of judicial power in making
additional public interest considerations is still checked by the fourth fair use
factor or Article 21 of the Copyright Implementation Regulation, which
protects the market value of copyrighted works.246
Second, the proactive examination of public interest by courts comports
with social justice, a value that serves as the bedrock of any judicial
system.247 Fair use, by its very nature, is designed to promote social justice.248
It prevents the knowledge and information embodied in works from being
246 See supra text accompanying note 61 (providing an unauthorized use of a work “shall not impair
the normal exploitation of the work concerned, nor unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
copyright owner”).
247 As John Rawls points out, “the principles of social justice . . . provide a way of assigning rights
and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define the appropriate distribution of the benefits
and burdens of social cooperation.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 4 (rev. ed. 1999).
248 See, e.g., SUNDER, supra note 137, at 105–19 (considering examples about how fair use can
promote social justice); Haochen Sun, Copyright and Responsibility, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 263,
299 (2013) (discussing how copyright law can promote social justice).

172

16:123 (2019)

Copyright Law as an Engine of Public Interest Protection

monopolized by copyright holders at the expense of the public interest. If
courts do not examine whether a work was used in the public interest simply
because a user fails to submit any or sufficient evidence, they will legally
permit a copyright holder to override public interests beneficial to a
particular group of users or to society at large. Against this backdrop, social
justice demands that courts call the copyright holder’s claim of infringement
into question. Doing so further allows them to make proactive inquiries into
the extent to which the public interest would be impaired should they uphold
the claim.
In deciding the web caching case, the Beijing First Intermediate Court
undertook such a proactive inquiry in considering whether a total ban on the
provision of web caching services would severely jeopardize the public
interest. According to the Court, without the shield of fair use, web caching
would be deemed an infringement of copyright. To avoid potential legal
liabilities, search engine service providers would have to shoulder the
unnecessarily troublesome burden of carrying out numerous preliminary and
time-consuming checks to remove web caches that infringe copyright. The
Beijing First Intermediate Court reasoned that, given the current level of
technological development, it would be infeasible to delete web caches
simultaneously with website changes. Nor would it be feasible for search
engine service providers to obtain permission proactively from all copyright
owners to offer a web caching service. All such providers would cease
providing web caches if they were held liable for copyright infringement,
which would seriously harm the public interest. Accordingly, for the sake of
certain copyright owners’ interests, the public would be deprived of the
benefits brought about by web caches, and search engine service providers
would have to bear an unnecessary burden.
V. INVIGORATING THE PUBLIC INTEREST PRINCIPLE DOMESTICALLY AND
GLOBALLY
Like many legal principles and standards, the proposed public interest
principle and its substantive and procedural standards are by no means
perfect. In this part of the article, I respond to the major concerns over both
the public interest principle and its subsidiary standards. Furthermore, I
consider how and why the principle could play a uniquely important role in
bridging the gaps between the fair use and fair dealing doctrines.
A. Preventing the Public Interest Principle from Becoming a Leviathan
1. Against an Over-Capacious Principle
The first criticism that might be leveled against the public interest
principle is that the principle is so capacious that it might easily infringe upon
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private interests in the name of protecting the public interest. Were that to
occur, copyright holders would end up sacrificing too much financially. As
the U.S. Supreme Court has aptly cautioned, “[a]ny copyright infringer may
claim to benefit the public by increasing public access to the copyrighted
work. But . . . we see no warrant for judicially imposing, a ‘compulsory
license’ permitting unfettered access.”249 The single-minded prioritization of
the public interest would render copyright as a private right meaningless. It
would deprive copyright holders of their economic interests in circulating
their works in the marketplace, ultimately deterring them from creating or
disseminating new works,250 which would in turn impair the public interest.
In response to these valid concerns, I argue that the public interest
principle actually requires courts to take copyright holders’ economic
interests seriously. To that end, it places the first factor, which carries the
public interest use standard, under the scrutiny of the other fair use factors.
Although the public interest principle situates the overall fair use analysis
within the context of the public interest at large, it does not deviate from the
traditional judicial practice of applying fair use factors in a holistic and
balanced manner.251 The principle by no means empowers the first factor to
override the other fair use factors, the fourth factor in particular. Instead, it
guards against the harmful disruption of copyright holders’ market by
maintaining the fourth factor on an equal footing with the first. It also rules
out consideration of the market benefits to copyright holders to ensure an
appropriate assessment of the potential market harm to them.252 With these
built-in limits on its application, the public interest principle thereby serves
as a vehicle for courts to achieve the balanced application of all four fair use
factors by permitting them to serve as a check on one another.
The U.S. courts’ fair use rulings in digital library cases demonstrate that
the public interest principle, if properly applied with meticulous weighing up
between the first and fourth factors, poses no major threats to copyright
holders. After all, despite Google Library and the HathiTrust Digital Library
now having existed for more than a decade, the publishing industry is still

249

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985).
See Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2014) (“A fair use must not excessively
damage the market for the original by providing the public with a substitute for that original work.”).
251 Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1308 (11th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236–37 (1990)) (“The fair use doctrine is an
‘equitable rule of reason’; neither the examples of possible fair uses nor the four statutory factors are to
be considered exclusive.”); Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1283 (2014) (ruling that
Section 107 requires “a holistic analysis which carefully balanced the four factors”).
252 See supra text accompanying notes 170–82.
250
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enjoying healthy growth.253 Even the university presses, whose imminent
demise was widely predicted in the social media age, are prospering.254 What
really matters today is whether copyright holders can adapt to take full
advantage of digital technologies as an important means of marketing their
works.255
At the same time, the public interest principle also forbids misuse of the
fourth factor. As market harm is always a matter of degree,256 it prevents
courts from interpreting the scope of the protectable market of a work in an
overly broad fashion. Instead, it forces courts to draw a line between the
scope of unauthorized uses of the work in the public interest and the scope
of the work’s protectable market for issuing valid licenses for its use or the
creation of its derivatives. On the one hand, courts must consider the scope
of public interest uses in terms of the first factor, as they have long done in
cases involving transformative uses.257 On the other, they must consider
whether the scope of the protectable market claimed by the copyright holder
is reasonable under the fourth factor.258 Meticulous examination of both
matters is essential for courts to decide whether an unauthorized use has
caused significant market harm to the copyright holder.259 Should courts

253 See Julie Bosmanaug, Publishing Gives Hints of Revival, Data Show, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/books/survey-shows-publishing-expanded-since-2008.html
[https://perma.cc/M2AG-DZH3].
254 See Chris Plattsmier, University Presses are Thriving, Not Broken, ACLS (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://www.humanitiesebook.org/university-presses-are-thriving-not-broken/ [https://perma.cc/73G6MUZT].
255 See Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 94 MINN.
L. REV. 1308, 1132 (2010) (“In the digital era, authors are in a better position than in the past to grow
their own audiences, cultivate reputations that attract readers, and provide their works to readers through
alternative distribution channels. . . .”); Mike Shields, “Growth has been significant”: Publishers are
Falling in Love with Apple News, BUS. INSIDER (May 9, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/
publishers-are-falling-in-love-with-apple-news-2018-5 [https://perma.cc/3JF2-KXEV].
256 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 n.21 (1994) (“Market harm is a matter
of degree, and the importance of [the fourth] factor will vary, not only with the amount of harm, but also
with the relative strength of the showing on the other factors.”).
257 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (ruling that parody “provide[s] social benefit, by shedding
light on an earlier work . . . “).
258 Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1277 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Put simply, absent
evidence to the contrary, if a copyright holder has not made a license available to use a particular work
in a particular manner, the inference is that the author or publisher did not think that there would be
enough such use to bother making a license available. In such a case, there is little damage to the
publisher’s market when someone makes use of the work in that way without obtaining a license, and
hence the fourth factor should generally weigh in favor of fair use.”).
259 Id. at 1276 (“The goal of copyright is to stimulate the creation of new works, not to furnish
copyright holders with control over all markets. Accordingly, the ability to license does not demand a
finding against fair use.”); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929 n.17 (2d Cir. 1994)
(“[A] copyright holder can always assert some degree of adverse [effect] on its potential licensing
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deviate from this pattern of reasoning, their application of the fourth factor
will be detrimental to the public interest.260
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Harper & Row ruling exemplifies the
incorrect application of the first and fourth fair use factors without any
consideration of the public interest. In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court
held that The Nation’s unauthorized publication of approximately three
hundred words of a direct quotation from President Gerald Ford’s thenunpublished memoirs did not constitute a fair use.261 The Court’s overly
restrictive interpretation of the first and fourth fair use factors is quite
problematic. Overly emphasizing the commercial nature of the use
concerned, the Court failed to grasp the significance of the public interests
involved in the use concerned. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his
dissenting opinion, such use was vital to lending authenticity to the
magazine’s news reporting on a historical event, i.e., the resignation and
pardon of President Richard Nixon. Keeping the public informed of the
details of that event undoubtedly “furthered the public interest”262 in “[the]
broad dissemination of principles, ideas, and factual information [that] is
crucial to . . . robust public debate and [an] informed citizenry.”263
Moreover, if it had recognized The Nation’s use as a public interest use,
the Court would have had to modify its ruling on the fourth factor. It ruled
in favor of the copyright holder on the fourth factor on the grounds that its
interest had been harmed by the single cancellation of an offer to publish the
memoirs as a magazine serial and subsequent refusal to pay it $12,500.264
However, the Court’s finding that this single cancellation qualified as
significant harm to the copyright holder’s interests is dubious to say the least.
In fact, the copyright holder failed to demonstrate that the use in question
caused any harm to the work’s potential market.265 Although the defendant
used the heart of that then-unpublished work, in weighing up all four factors,
analysis of the first and fourth factors should still have led the Court to rule
in its favor. Had the public interest principle guided the Court, it would have
ruled the use concerned to constitute a fair use.

revenues as a consequence of the secondary use at issue simply because the copyright holder has not been
paid a fee to permit that particular use.”) (citations omitted).
260 See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of
Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. 1, 30 (1997) (pointing out that the
inappropriate application of the fourth factor “can inappropriately skew the fair use analysis to favor the
rights of copyright owners”).
261 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 542–45 (1985).
262 Id. at 591.
263 Id. at 582 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
264 Id. at 567.
265 See Fromer, supra note 165, at 625.
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2. Against an Over-Ambiguous Principle
One could further argue against the public interest principle by pointing
out that public interest is a deeply troubling concept given the tremendous
difficulty of defining its nature and scope. As the concept still remains illdefined, the application of the public interest principle to fair use cases would
lead to myriad unintended negative consequences, thereby further
aggravating the extant uncertainties surrounding the fair use doctrine.266
However, the law itself has been replete with legal terms that are
ambiguous in nature since its inception.267 History is witness to the positive
evolution of the law over time despite the ambiguity deeply embedded into
its every verbal ingredient. For that matter, language itself is fraught with
ambiguities. As long as the law relies on language to convey its prescriptions,
the problem of ambiguity will persist.268 For example, under the U.S.
Constitution, it is legal for the government to exercise its eminent domain
power to take private property for public use provided that fair compensation
is paid to the owner.269 This takings clause has been implemented for ages
without any proper delineation of the public interest in the taking of private
property.270
Hence, it makes no sense to argue against the public interest principle
simply by faulting it for its ambiguity. Rather, the issue of ambiguity should
be understood as a double-edged sword. While dealing with its negative
effects, we can also take advantage of its positive effects in protecting the
public interest. On the one hand, we can take measures to moderate the
ambiguity of the public interest principle to the greatest extent possible. In
Part III, I discuss how courts can ascertain public interests by identifying the
group- or society-based interests in using a given work.271 Therefore, it is
quite feasible to inject a proper degree of certainty into the judicial
application of the principle.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the public interest principle’s
ambiguity is actually necessary to ensure that the principle is sufficiently
broad-based to accommodate a wide range of socially beneficial interests in
using copyrighted works. At the policy level, the public interest principle’s
ambiguity may help create a relatively flexible environment that supports
266 See e.g., Sun, supra note 3, at 303–04 (discussing the indeterminacy of the fair use doctrine);
Beebe, supra note 9, at 16 (asserting that “fair use is such an amorphous body of doctrine and its outcomes
so unpredictable”).
267 Sun, supra note 3, at 304.
268 Id.
269 The Fifth Amendment states that “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
270 Sun, supra note 3, at 319–20.
271 See supra text accompanying notes 138–48.
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technological innovation272 and cultural development.273 At the doctrinal
level, the principle’s ambiguity would help courts to protect public interests
that are still underserved by the prevailing interpretation of the fair use
doctrine. The U.S. Supreme Court has designated satire as far less worthy
than parody of receiving fair use protection.274 In so ruling, the Court has
handed down a clear definition of the public interest in the parodic use of a
work, stating that it is deserving of protection because it informs the public
of a “new expression, meaning, or message”275 that can be added to the work.
However, a broader, albeit more ambiguous understanding of the public
interest could produce the positive effect of requiring courts to consider the
larger social benefits that satirical uses may confer. For example, the Second
Circuit held in Blanch v. Koons that Jeff Koons’s satirical use of a portion of
a photograph in a collage should be deemed fair use. 276 The court pointed
out that the photo concerned was “fodder for [the user’s] commentary on
[the] social and aesthetic consequences of mass media.”277 As satire carries
society-based public interests, it is regarded as a fair dealing exemption
under the copyright laws of a number of countries, including the UK278 and
Australia.279
3. Against an Over-Monolithic Principle
A further ground for criticism of the public interest principle is that its
emphasis on the public interest would rule out private uses of works that
serve users’ individual interests but have long been deemed legal under
See, e.g., Chander, supra note 8, at 664 (“The American concept of ‘fair use’ . . . proved
conducive to various innovations in the digital realm.”); Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation
Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 862 (2008) (arguing that “fair use as a component of innovation
policy suggests that courts and policy-makers must strive to make fair use something on which innovators
may more easily rely”); Robin A. Moore, Fair Use and Innovation Policy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 944, 946–
47 (2007).
273 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 50 (2004) (“To make intellectual property
consistent with the idea of free speech as democratic culture, there must be a robust and ever expanding
public domain with generous fair use rights.”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic
Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 288 (1996) (arguing that copyright law functions to support “a sector
of creative and communicative activity that is relatively free from reliance on state subsidy, elite
patronage, and cultural hierarchy”).
274 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994) (“Parody needs to mimic an
original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’)
imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of
borrowing.”); see also SUNDER, supra note 137, at 120 (explaining why courts and scholars have treated
satire and parody differently).
275 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
276 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 2006).
277 Id. at 253.
278 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c.48, s 30A (U.K.).
279 Australian Copyright Act 1968, § 41A (Austl.).
272
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copyright law. Examples of such private uses include recording television
programs for the time-shifting purpose of viewing them at a later time280 and
downloading music from a computer for the space-shifting purpose of
listening to it at another location of the user’s choosing.281 Private uses
preserve users’ anonymity, which “permits these activities to go forward,
and allows fair users to decide later whether to reveal their identities when
releasing their work.”282 Therefore, private uses legally protect the right to
privacy, an individual interest that is actually dear to the public.283
To be sure, private uses can hardly satisfy the public interest use
standard under the fair use factor, as they primarily serve users’ individual
interests in a private setting. However, it does not necessarily follow that if
courts were guided by the public interest principle, the fair use doctrine
would disallow all private uses. Instead, it would protect non-commercial
private uses that do not cause significant market harm to the copyright
holders. For instance, the private use of a work for the aforementioned timeshifting purpose would still be deemed legal. As the U.S. Supreme Court’s
ruling in Sony shows, such use does not cause “any likelihood of nonminimal
harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works.”284
B. Bridging the Gaps between Fair Use and Fair Dealing
By nature, the fair dealing doctrine plays the same role as the fair use
doctrine by allowing the public to use copyrighted works without
authorization from the copyright holders and without paying them royalties.
The striking discrepancies between the two doctrines lie chiefly in the
structure of their legislative format and responsiveness to the role of courts.
Fair dealing has entrenched an exhaustive list of exemptions and the rigid
application of legal factors. Fair use, in contrast, is known for its flexibility
owing to its non-exhaustive itemization of exemptions and open-ended
application of legal factors. 285 Consequently, the fair use doctrine affords
courts greater latitude in deciding the outcomes of disputes on a case-by-case
280 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 454–56 (1984) (ruling that “timeshifting” of copyrighted television shows with videotape recorders (VTR) constituted fair use primarily
because it did not have negative effects on the current as well as the potential market for the copyrighted
works).
281 Relying upon Sony, the court in Recording Industry Ass’n of America v. Diamond Multimedia
Systems, Inc. held that copying for space-shifting purposes is “paradigmatic noncommercial personal use
entirely consistent with the purposes of the [Copyright] Act.” 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999); cf.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the ruling that spaceshifting is fair use); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
282 See Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 598 (2003).
283 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65–66 (1973).
284 Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
285 See, e.g., BURRELL & COLEMAN, supra note 8, at 252.
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basis and more power to come up with additional legal standards for judicial
decision-making.286
Despite these differences, I argue that the public interest principle can
guide courts toward applying the fair dealing doctrine, in addition to the fair
use doctrine. In this way, the principle would serve as a meaningful
alternative approach to bridging the gaps between fair use and fair dealing,
an issue that has long troubled copyright scholars and practitioners.287 The
principle obviates the need to reform fair dealing by adopting open-ended
fair use standards and the need to reform fair use by injecting the kinds of
certainty that fair dealing affords. Application of the principle would thus
steer the discourse away from whether the flexible fair use doctrine or the
rigid fair dealing doctrine is more advantageous. I do not argue the case for
the former to replace the latter on its own merits, or vice versa. Instead, I
propose that the public interest principle can serve as a commonly shared
principle for adjudicating fair use and fair dealing cases and developing
further legislative reforms aimed at fixing the major problems with both
doctrines.
1. Acting as a Guiding Principle
First and foremost, what matters most for both the fair use and fair
dealing doctrines, in my view, are the principles that can guide the courts in
interpreting those doctrines. Despite the differences in their overall
legislative structure, a commonality between fair use and fair dealing is the
direct application of legal factors without the concomitant adoption of a
guiding principle for such factor-based application. The fair use doctrine
routinely entails judicial inquiries into the four fair use factors. Similarly, the
fair dealing doctrine operates in a two-tier cluster of factors in common law
jurisdictions. It first triggers a judicial inquiry into whether a given use of a
work falls into any of the statutory factors enumerated in the various fair
dealing exemptions. Then, following the Hubbard v. Vosper ruling in the
UK, it further requires courts to consider whether the use is fair by applying
a few additional factors.288 In Canada, those factors include (1) the purpose

286

Pamela Samuelson, Justifications for Copyright Limitations and Exceptions, in COPYRIGHT LAW

IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 45 (Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2017) (pointing out that one of the

reasons why “civil law countries have generally been reluctant to adopt a flexible and open-ended
[limitation and exception], such as fair use” is that “legislatures in those countries are expected to define
the balance of rights between copyright owners and the public”).
287 See id. (arguing that “a key advantage of a flexible [limitation and exception]” is that “it enables
the law to adapt to new circumstances and evolve over time without the need for continual statutory
amendments”).
288 Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 Q.B. 84. per Lord Denning at 1027. In this ruling, Lord Denning
explicated factors for weighing on fairness as follows:
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of the dealing; (2) the character of the dealing; (3) the amount of the dealing;
(4) alternatives to the dealing; (5) the nature of the work; and (6) the effect
of the dealing on the work.289
Without a guiding principle, the factor-based application of the fair use
and fair dealing doctrines has resulted in diametrically opposing rulings.
Despite the open-ended, flexible nature of fair use and the public interestoriented Campbell ruling, U.S. courts have still rendered copyright holdercentric rulings by interpreting the fair use factors restrictively. The U.S.
Supreme Court’s ruling in Harper & Row is a case in point.290 Conversely,
despite the widely held belief in the fixed, rigid nature of the fair dealing
doctrine and judicial assertions that the doctrine has been interpreted
strictly,291 the Supreme Court of Canada’s rulings in CCH and its progeny
have rendered liberal interpretations of the doctrine by applying public
interest considerations.292 Similarly, the Court of Justice of the European
Union has defined parody broadly on the basis of freedom of expression,

It is impossible to define what is “fair dealing”. It must be a question of degree. You must consider
first the number and extent of the quotations and extracts. Are they altogether too many and too
long to be fair? Then you must consider the use made of them. If they are used as a basis for
comment, criticism or review, that may be a fair dealing. If they are used to convey the same
information as the author, for a rival purpose, that may be unfair. Next, you must consider the
proportions. To take long extracts and attach short comments may be un-fair. But, short extracts
and long comments may be fair. Other considerations may come to mind also. But, after all is said
and done, it must be a matter of impression. As with fair comment in the law of libel, so with fair
dealing in the law of copyright. The tribunal of fact must decide.
Id.
289

See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 399, ¶ 53 (Can.).
Sun, supra note 3, at 321 (pointing out that the Harper & Row-type judicial practice of treating
fair use as an affirmative defense “would give rise to the problem that [the public’s] rights are
automatically ‘ranked’ lower than copyrights” and that “courts actually water down the importance of
protecting public interest”); NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 64–65 (2008) (“Since
Harper & Row, the Blackstonian property-centered view of fair use has steadily gained ground.”).
291 See, e.g., Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, 2014 E.C.R. ¶ 43 (ruling that “the conditions
set out in Article 5 [of the EU Copyright Directive that governs exceptions and limitations to copyright]
must generally be interpreted strictly”); Case C-5/08, Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades
Forening, 2009 E.C.R. I-0000 (ruling that fair dealing exceptions must be interpreted strictly).
292 See Giuseppina D’Agnostino, Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of
Canada’s Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair Use, 53 MCGILL L.J. 309, 309 (2008) (arguing
that the concept of U.S. fair use, which theoretically allows any type of use to be “fair” and merely
provides factors to assist courts in their decision-making, while suggesting that Canada seek to build on
the distinctive features of its fair dealing regime, such as its policy preoccupations that avoid championing
owners’ rights, and factors for determining fair dealing that are more flexible than U.S. fair use); see also
Peter K. Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants, 7 MDPI LAWS 9, 12 (2018), available at
http://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/7/1/9 [https://perma.cc/P85E-PF4F] (arguing that “a jurisdiction that
refuses to introduce fair use but is open to adopting a broad fair dealing exception for quotation could
easily achieve many important benefits provided by the fair use provision, especially if judges are willing
to liberally construe the quotation exception”).
290
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allowing the parodic use of a work to function as a satire with social and
political criticism.293
Given that the issue of interpretation is central to both doctrines, the
public interest principle would play a pivotal role in guiding courts to not
only interpret the legal factors thereunder but also to determine the outcomes
of hard cases after weighing those factors. To be sure, courts can rely on the
fair use or fair dealing factors to settle easy cases adequately. However, they
encounter severe difficulties in attempting to settle hard cases by relying
solely on those factors.
In hard cases, courts are confronted with the thorny issue of how to
apply the fair use or fair dealing doctrine to address the conflict between the
public interest in sharing the information contained in a copyrighted work
and the private interest in controlling the exclusive ownership of that work.294
They have to deal with such bewilderingly complex tasks as drawing a line
between the transformative use of a work and preparing a derivative of that
work295 and defining the scope of the market for the work.296 In these
circumstances, the public interest principle would serve to guide courts in
dealing with hard cases by shedding light on how best to address the conflict
between public and private interests. Its subsidiary public interest use
standard would require courts to consider whether a work was used in the
public interest or for the user’s own private interest. If they find the former
to be the case, then they can simultaneously identify the extent to which the
use serves group- or society-based public interests. Moreover, the principle’s

293

In Deckmyn, the Court offered a broad definition of parody as follows:

[T]he concept of parody in the Directive ought not to be confined to the case of a parody having
no meaning beyond the original, work parodied. It could perhaps be argued that, from the point
of view of literary theory, the most deeply-rooted type of parody is that which, whatever the
intention, is essentially designed to refer to the original work. Irrespective of that, it cannot be
denied that criticism of customs, social criticism and political criticism have also, from time
immemorial and clearly for the purpose of conveying a message effectively, made use of the
privileged medium entailing the alteration of a pre-existing work, which is sufficiently
recognisable to the public at which that criticism is directed.
Deckmyn, C-201/13, ¶ 64; see also Graeme W. Austin, EU and US Perspectives on Fair Dealing for the
Purpose of Parody or Satire, 39 UNSW L.J. 684, 688 (2016) (noting that the Court “interpreted the
concept ‘parody’ quite broadly”).
294 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1977) (arguing that in a hard case,
“the judge has, accordingly to that theory, a discretion to decide the case either way”).
295 See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433, 442 (2008); Jane C.
Ginsburg, Letter from the US: Exclusive Rights, Exceptions, and Uncertain Compliance with
International Norms – Part II (Fair Use) 4–19 (Columbia Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 503,
Jan. 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2539178 [https://perma.cc/U9EL-V7E7].
296 Regarding the circularity problem in defining the scope of market, see, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press
v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir. 1996); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.,
60 F.3d 913, 929 (2d Cir. 1994).
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significant market harm principle would dictate that courts protect a public
interest use only if such protection would not cause significant harm to the
market value of the work.
2. Paving the Way for Adoption of the Public Interest Principle
There are very good prospects that the public interest principle can be
adopted in both fair use and fair dealing jurisdictions because courts there
are increasingly embracing the practice of deciding cases in light of the
public interest. By spelling out the concept of transformative use, the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Campbell ruling paved the way for applying the fair use
factors with public interest considerations. Since Campbell, the U.S. courts
have decided a large number of fair use cases in the public interest. 297 Their
rulings in the Google Library and HathiTrust Digital Library cases not only
epitomize this steadily growing judicial practice but have also developed
new dimensions of fair use adjudication that are compatible with the legal
standards embodied in the public interest principle I propose herein.
Meanwhile, courts in jurisdictions following the fair dealing doctrine
are also increasingly applying that doctrine in the public interest. The 1988
U.K. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act contains a general provision
mandating the application of the fair dealing doctrine with public interest
considerations. It states that “[n]othing in this Part affects any rule of law
preventing or restricting the enforcement of copyright, on grounds of public
interest or otherwise.”298 With regard to the “reporting current events”
defense, the U.K courts have decided that it should be interpreted liberally299
“to reflect the public interest in freedom of expression and, in particular, the
freedom of the press.”300 Similarly, there have been very positive
developments in court decisions on fair dealing cases in China in light of the
public interest. Despite the rulings against Google Library, as shown in
Section C of Part IV of this article, the Beijing First Intermediate Court
boldly examined the nature and scope of Chinese fair dealing provisions in
light of the public interest in those rulings.301 Most importantly, the Supreme
Court of Canada, as noted in Section B of Part IV, has adopted a more liberal
approach to defining fair dealing as a user right.302
297

See supra text accompanying notes 101–14.
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, § 171(3) (U.K.) (emphasis added).
299 Pro Sieben A.G. v. Carlton Television Ltd [1999] 1 WLR 605 at 614G.
300 Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1142, ¶ 66 (July 18, 2001). The Court also
pointed out that this defense “is clearly intended to protect the role of the media in informing the public
about matters of current concern to the public.” Id. ¶ 64.
301 See supra text accompanying notes 243–48.
302 See, e.g., Michael Geist, Fairness Found: How Canada Quietly Shifted from Fair Dealing to Fair
Use, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS
OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 157, 169 (Michael Geist ed., 2013).
298
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3. Making the Principle Compatible with Fair Dealing
Third, the public interest principle is not necessarily incompatible with
the exhaustive enumeration of fair dealing exemptions. Rather, it can play a
positive role in helping courts to interpret specific fair dealing exemptions
and the criteria for evaluating fairness. Take the fair dealing doctrine in UK
as an example. Fair dealing exemptions therein such as “research” and
“study,”303 “criticism or review,”304 “reporting current events,”305 and
“caricature, parody, or pastiche”306 are crudely enumerated without having
their contours properly defined, which calls into question exactly how the
UK courts should interpret the nature and scope of those exemptions.
In this context, the public interest principle can help courts to shed light
on each enumerated exemption. Take the research exemption for instance.
Without taking the public interest into account, the UK courts have ruled that
this exemption permits only non-commercial research.307 By contrast, the
Supreme Court of Canada has decided to interpret it in light of the public
interest. By defining the scope of research in “a large and liberal”308 manner,
the Canadian Court held that the research exemption allows commercial
research performed in the public interest.309 Similarly, as discussed in the
earlier part of this section, the public interest principle can guide courts’
evaluations of fair dealing.310
4. Setting Common Goals and Agendas for Further Reforms
Last but not least, the public interest principle sets common goals and
agendas for initiating more constructive reforms of both doctrines in the
public interest.311 Compatible with the relevant international copyright
treaties,312 the principle affords courts sufficient latitude to capitalize on
public interest considerations in fair use or fair dealing cases.
303

Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, ch. 48; § 29 (U.K.).
Id. § 30.
305 Id.
306 Id. § 30A.
307 See, e.g., Controller of HM Stationery Office & Anor v Green Amps Ltd [2007] EWHC 2755
¶ 21 (Ch).
308 CCH Canadian Ltd. V. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 399 ¶ 51 (Can.).
309 Id. (holding that “[l]awyers carrying on the business of law for profit are conducting research”).
310 See supra text accompanying notes 288–96.
311
Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss has argued for the need to set common goals and agendas for
reforming both fair use and fair dealing doctrines around the world. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
TRIPS—Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 34 (2004) (“[I]t is worth comparing
the traditional intellectual property regimes of developed countries to find commonalities (such as fair
use and fair dealing) that are not currently phrased as affirmative rights, and that may not reflect identical
guarantees, but that nonetheless assure that users have access to innovations.”).
312 Samuelson, supra note 286, at 53 (“Although some scholars have questioned whether open-ended
[limitations and exceptions], such as fair use, are consistent with international treaty obligations, many
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Akin to the fair use doctrine, the burden of proving fair dealing is placed
on the defendant in judicial proceedings.313 Therefore, it would be desirable
to apply the public interest principle to usher in a legislative or judicial
reform that would reallocate the burden of proof between the plaintiff and
defendant in the manner I suggest in Part IV.
It would also be desirable to reconsider whether fair dealing should
maintain its exhaustive enumeration of exemptions, although such
reconsideration may not be needed to inquire into whether the open-ended
merits of fair use should be transplanted into fair dealing. What really matters
in effectuating the public interest principle is to determine whether the
legislature should give the judiciary more power to apply the principle to
adjudicate fair dealing cases competently.314 One possible pathway to such
reform would be the inclusion of a provision providing that fair dealing
permits public interest uses in the statutory enumeration of fair dealing
exemptions.315 The Chinese government is already considering this type of
reform to fair dealing in China. The latest draft amendment proposes that the
exhaustive list of fair dealing exemptions under Article 22 of the Chinese
Copyright Law should be broadened by incorporating a provision expressly
allowing the Chinese courts to recognize new fair dealing exemptions not
listed under that article.316

European as well as U.S. scholars make compelling arguments that fair use and other flexible [limitations
and exceptions] are compatible with treaty obligations.”).
313 See LIONEL BENTLY ET AL., INTELLECTUAL P ROPERTY LAW 226 (2018) (pointing out that the fair
dealing defense “only comes into play once a claimant has established that copyright has been infringed.
Where this occurs, the onus of proof [then] falls on the defendant to prove that one of the exceptions
applies”).
314 Robert Burrell, The Changing Judicial Politics of Copyright Exceptions in the UK, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
(Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Wee Loon Ng-Loy & Haochen Sun eds., forthcoming 2019) (“Judges in
copyright cases may not be merely weighing the interests of copyright owners and users. They may also
be involved in the ultimately more important tasks of holding the executive to account, setting the limits
of executive rulemaking and establishing the relationship between national law and supranational legal
obligations.”). For arguments about conferring more power on the judiciary in fair dealing jurisdictions,
see Martin Senftleben, The Perfect Match – Civil Law Judges and Open-Ended Fair Use Provisions, 33
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 231, 233 (2017) (arguing that “civil law judges are capable of applying open-ended
fair use norms adequately and consistently”).
315
See, e.g., Michael Handler & Emily Hudson, Fair Use as an Advance on Fair Dealing?
Depolarising the Debate, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS
IN COMPARATIVE P ERSPECTIVE (Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Wee Loon Ng-Loy & Haochen Sun eds.,
forthcoming 2019) (proposing to expand fair dealing with “the addition of new fair dealing purposes or
the development of other closed provisions that utilize a less prescriptive drafting style”).
316 Edward Chatterton & Horace Lam, Amendments to the PRC Copyright Law. . . . The Practical
Implications for Rights Owners (Aug. 1, 2014), available at https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=6d3a69f3-e558-4fba-ae7b-88140cd3b322 [https://perma.cc/VU3D-XJNT].
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VI. CONCLUSION
Google has scanned over twenty million books for its Library Project,
accounting for approximately one-seventh of all books published since the
invention of the printing press.317 Despite being hailed as “the most
significant humanities project of our time,”318 Google Library is still illegal
in a number of countries,319 China among them. Relying on the fair dealing
doctrine, the Chinese courts not only dealt a huge blow to Google Library,
but also placed the public interest at serious risk.
Although the U.S. courts shielded Google Library through the
application of the fair use doctrine, they did not remove all legal
impediments to the potential creation of digital public libraries. They did,
however, instill hope that such a library might be created in the digital age.320
The U.S. courts not only saved Google Library by interpreting the fair use
doctrine in light of the public interest, but also shed light on the importance
of the public interest principle I propose in this article.
The public interest principle, as I have shown herein, is intended to
reshape both the fair use and fair dealing doctrines to ensure that they can
better serve the larger social needs of the globalized digital world. The
consistent application of the principle by courts around the world would
develop collective wisdom about maximizing usage of the merits of both
doctrines while minimizing the effect of their demerits.
By embracing the proposed public interest principle, both the judiciary
and the legislature would ensure that copyright law gains a more pertinent
role in shaping the new age of big data and artificial intelligence in which
the use of knowledge and information is more important than ever before.321
317 Jon
Orwant, Ngram Viewer 2.0, GOOGLE AI BLOG (Oct. 18, 2012),
https://research.googleblog.com/2012/10/ngram-viewer-20.html [https://perma.cc/LVR4-E8CM].
318 James Somers, Torching the Modern-Day Library of Alexandria, ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/04/the-tragedy-of-google-books/523320
[https://perma.cc/7PPX-YNX6]; Tim Wu, What Ever Happened to Google Books?, NEW YORKER (Sep.
11,
2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/what-ever-happened-to-googlebooks?mbid=rss [https://perma.cc/B8HZ-3S6P] (“It was the most ambitious library project of our time—
a plan to scan all of the world’s books and make them available to the public online.”).
319 Gaelle Faure, French Court Shuts Down Google Books Project, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2009),
articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/19/world/la-fg-france-google19-2009dec19
[https://perma.cc/E5B5FQNN].
320
See Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement as Copyright Reform, 2011 WISC. L. REV.
479, 562 (2011) (emphasizing that “the accumulated knowledge of humankind contained in millions of
books from major research library collections can be made widely available to future generations through
digitally networked environments”).
321 See Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for Cyberspace,
53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 114 (2001) (predicating the necessity to reform the fair use doctrine so that it “will
be a superior mechanism for safeguarding the public interest in a way that facilitates dispersion of the
new benefits that the Internet offers to society as a whole”); Benjamin L. W. Sobel, Artificial
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Hence, the public interest principle, if properly applied, could serve as a
powerhouse dedicated to revolutionizing copyright law as a legal engine of
public interest protection.

Intelligence’s Fair Use Crisis, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 45, 97 (2017) (concluding that although “[t]he
fair use dilemma is a genuine dilemma [in the age of artificial intelligence], . . . it offers an opportunity
to promote social equity by reasserting the purpose of copyright law”).
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